Contrary to popular belief, Article 3 of the Constitution provides a sparse blueprint for the federal judiciary. It establishes "one Supreme Court" but delegates the creation of lower courts and even the Supreme Court's size to congressional legislation, making the judiciary's structure far more flexible than assumed.

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The Supreme Court's authority to declare laws unconstitutional—its main function today—is not explicitly mentioned in Article 3. This power of judicial review was established by the Court itself in the early 19th century, fundamentally shaping its role in the U.S. government's balance of powers.

Congress can alter the number of Supreme Court justices and even limit the types of cases the court can hear—a power known as "jurisdiction stripping"—through simple legislation. Despite this authority, a deep-seated political norm has prevented Congress from exercising it aggressively, leaving its full constitutional extent untested.

Each Supreme Court justice employs four elite, recent law school graduates as clerks. These young, unelected individuals hold immense responsibility, making preliminary judgments on which cases the court should hear and writing the first drafts of opinions that shape American law—a reality not contemplated by the Constitution.

The U.S. founding documents, like the Constitution and Bill of Rights, contain intentionally vague language. This was not an oversight but a necessary compromise to unify disparate interests, creating a built-in ambiguity that is the primary reason for 250 years of legal and political argument.

The Constitution lacks an "immigration clause." The Supreme Court established this authority as an "inherent power" derived from national sovereignty, not specific text. This plenary power, created by judicial interpretation, is assigned to Congress.

The U.S. is unique among developed nations for granting judges life tenure. While intended to ensure independence, this practice incentivizes justices to strategically retire under a politically aligned president, injecting politics into the end of their careers just as it exists at the beginning.

Janet Napolitano argues that recent Supreme Court doctrines presume a level of legislative clarity and capability that doesn't exist in modern politics. By expecting Congress to legislate with extreme precision on all major issues, the Court ignores institutional dysfunction and creates a standard the legislative branch cannot meet.

Representative Sharice Davids points out a common public misconception fueled by presidential rhetoric. Presidents often say "I passed this law," but their constitutional role is limited to signing or vetoing bills. The actual, complex work of drafting, negotiating, and passing legislation is the exclusive domain of Congress, a fact often obscured in political messaging.

The legislative process is notoriously slow, but this is an intentional feature. The Constitution's structure creates a deliberative, messy process to ensure that laws with nationwide impact are not passed hastily. This "inefficiency" functions as a crucial check on power, forcing negotiation and preventing rapid, potentially harmful policy shifts.

The Suspension Clause, which allows for suspending the right to challenge unlawful detention, is located in Article 1. This placement explicitly assigns the power to Congress, not the President, serving as a critical check on executive overreach during emergencies.