Congress can alter the number of Supreme Court justices and even limit the types of cases the court can hear—a power known as "jurisdiction stripping"—through simple legislation. Despite this authority, a deep-seated political norm has prevented Congress from exercising it aggressively, leaving its full constitutional extent untested.

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The Supreme Court's authority to declare laws unconstitutional—its main function today—is not explicitly mentioned in Article 3. This power of judicial review was established by the Court itself in the early 19th century, fundamentally shaping its role in the U.S. government's balance of powers.

The legal requirement that a plaintiff have a direct injury ("standing") is applied inconsistently. It can be a significant hurdle in some cases but is conveniently overlooked in others, suggesting it functions as a tool for the court to accept or reject cases based on its desire to rule on the underlying issue.

Each Supreme Court justice employs four elite, recent law school graduates as clerks. These young, unelected individuals hold immense responsibility, making preliminary judgments on which cases the court should hear and writing the first drafts of opinions that shape American law—a reality not contemplated by the Constitution.

Crucial U.S. institutions, while formally existing, have effectively ceased to function as checks on executive power. Congress has ceded its constitutional authority to tax and spend, and the Justice Department's independence from the White House has disintegrated, rendering them functionally inert.

Contrary to popular belief, Article 3 of the Constitution provides a sparse blueprint for the federal judiciary. It establishes "one Supreme Court" but delegates the creation of lower courts and even the Supreme Court's size to congressional legislation, making the judiciary's structure far more flexible than assumed.

The U.S. is unique among developed nations for granting judges life tenure. While intended to ensure independence, this practice incentivizes justices to strategically retire under a politically aligned president, injecting politics into the end of their careers just as it exists at the beginning.

Janet Napolitano argues that recent Supreme Court doctrines presume a level of legislative clarity and capability that doesn't exist in modern politics. By expecting Congress to legislate with extreme precision on all major issues, the Court ignores institutional dysfunction and creates a standard the legislative branch cannot meet.

Viewing the Roberts Court as a single, unbroken entity is misleading. Its early phase was a 5-4 court where Justice Kennedy often sided with liberals, creating a sense of balance. His retirement and the appointment of three Trump justices created a new, more predictably conservative and lopsided era.

The legislative process is notoriously slow, but this is an intentional feature. The Constitution's structure creates a deliberative, messy process to ensure that laws with nationwide impact are not passed hastily. This "inefficiency" functions as a crucial check on power, forcing negotiation and preventing rapid, potentially harmful policy shifts.

An increasing number of Supreme Court justices previously clerked for the Court, with several directly succeeding the justice they once worked for. This trend suggests a self-perpetuating system where retiring justices may influence the White House to appoint their "favorite clerk," creating a dynamic akin to an inherited title.