The disruption in the Strait of Hormuz isn't a formal closure. Instead, shippers and producers are adopting a "wait and see" approach, halting flows due to reports of damaged ships and skyrocketing insurance premiums, effectively creating a self-imposed blockade.

A little-known feature of marine insurance is that the war risk component can be canceled by insurers with just a few days' notice during a crisis. Shippers are then forced to repurchase coverage at premiums that can be 10 to 30 times higher than the original rate, drastically altering voyage economics.

The recent surge in oil prices to $78 per barrel is not just vague fear. Analyst models suggest the market has priced in an $8-13 risk premium, which corresponds directly to the expected impact of a complete, four-week closure of the Strait of Hormuz, providing a concrete measure of market sentiment.

Modern multinationals avoid the high cost and risk of securing foreign markets themselves. Instead, they 'draft' behind the U.S. government, which uses its diplomatic and military power to create favorable conditions. This effectively socializes geopolitical risk for corporations while they privatize the profits.

To combat China's ability to dump products and destabilize markets, the US government should act as a buyer of last resort for critical materials like rare earths. This would create a strategic reserve, similar to the petroleum reserve, ensuring price stability for domestic investment and manufacturing.

Iran effectively weaponized the Strait of Hormuz not with mines, but by creating enough uncertainty to make UK-based insurance companies pull out. This demonstrates how financial systems can be leveraged as powerful geopolitical choke points.

The administration justifies taking equity stakes in private industries—a form of state capitalism—by reframing the global landscape as an "economic war." The pandemic exposed critical supply chain vulnerabilities in areas like semiconductors and pharmaceuticals, making domestic production a matter of national security, similar to wartime industrial mobilization.

The conflict's primary impact on oil is not that supply is offline, but that its transport through the Strait of Hormuz is blocked. This distinction is key to understanding price scenarios, as supply exists but cannot be delivered.

Since the U.S. is a net oil exporter, controlling massive reserves like Venezuela's is less critical. The real power now lies in controlling the flow of oil to adversaries like China, which is dependent on imports and could be crippled by a supply cutoff.