Early versions of Figma failed to gain traction because designers, its target users, fundamentally didn't trust the tool's own subpar visual design. This meta-problem highlights that for a tool to be credible to its expert users, its own execution must embody the principles it espouses. A redesign was the key to unlocking user trust and adoption.
AI-powered "vibe coding" is reversing the design workflow. Instead of starting in Figma, designers now build functional prototypes directly with code-generating tools. Figma has shifted from being the first step (exploration) to the last step (fine-tuning the final 20% of pixel-perfect details).
The "Owner's Delusion" is the inability to see your own product from the perspective of a new user who lacks context. You forget they are busy, distracted, and have minimal intent. This leads to confusing UIs. The antidote is to consciously step back, "pretend you're a regular human being," and see if it still makes sense.
Initial data suggested the market for design tools was too small to build a large business. Figma's founders bet on the trend that design was becoming a key business differentiator, which would force the market to expand. They focused on building for the trend, not the existing TAM.
Product teams often use placeholder text and duplicate UI components, but users don't provide good feedback on unrealistic designs. A prototype with authentic, varied content—even if the UI is simpler—will elicit far more valuable user feedback because it feels real.
Early user research showed designers did not want a collaborative, multiplayer tool. However, Figma's web-based architecture made a single-player experience technically terrible (e.g., tabs constantly reloading). They were forced by the technology to build multiplayer functionality, which ultimately became their key differentiator, proving the platform's needs can override initial user requests.
Contrary to conventional startup advice, Figma's founders began with a fascination for a technology (WebGL) and then searched for a problem to solve. This technology-first approach, a hammer looking for a nail, led them to explore various failed ideas like face-swapping before eventually landing on collaborative design tools.
When FigJam felt soulless a month before launch, the team made a controversial decision to differentiate it by making it fun. This seemed frivolous but was strategically crucial for encouraging participation and creative expression in brainstorming sessions, especially during the remote-work era.
Figma learned that removing issues preventing users from adopting the product was as important as adding new features. They systematically tackled these blockers—often table stakes features—and saw a direct, measurable improvement in retention and activation after fixing each one.
For highly commoditized interactions like text editor undo or canvas pinch-to-zoom, users have powerful, ingrained expectations. Failing to match these conventions doesn't make a tool feel "different"; it makes it feel fundamentally unusable and broken, regardless of its other features. Innovation should be focused elsewhere.
Figma's success as a general-purpose design tool (useful for posters, floor plans, etc.) is precisely what makes it suboptimal for software development. Its WebGL-based canvas is fundamentally disconnected from the DOM, creating a "pretty picture" that requires a separate, costly engineering effort to translate into code.