Get your free personalized podcast brief

We scan new podcasts and send you the top 5 insights daily.

Miles Dieffenbach says Carnegie Mellon wants roughly a 4X net return, or 6-7X gross, from venture funds. For a $6B-plus multi-stage fund, even Anthropic's $18B round returning 20X may only return about 1X net; it cannot multiple the fund enough. He questions whether LPs can pencil clean risk-adjusted returns.

Related Insights

Even if top venture outcomes reach $20B, there are only about four such deals annually. Glenn Solomon argues a mega-fund would need to win all of them and own a significant stake just to break even, making the math for outsized returns nearly impossible.

While angel investors can afford speculative bets, venture funds operate under stricter mechanics. To invest at a high valuation like $500M, a fund must be able to underwrite a potential exit in the tens or hundreds of billions to satisfy the "return the fund" principle.

As venture capital firms scale to manage billions, their business model shifts from the 'artisan craft' of early-stage investing to an industrial process of asset gathering. This makes it difficult to focus on small, early opportunities and will likely result in IRRs that are no better than the industry average.

Benchmark Partner Ev Randall argues that large, multi-billion dollar VC funds struggle to generate the high-multiple returns (e.g., 5x net) that LPs seek from venture capital. He claims the sheer size of these funds "defies the laws of physics," positioning smaller, more constrained funds like Benchmark as better able to deliver traditional venture-like returns.

Emerging VCs miscalculate risk by chasing a "safer" 3x return. The venture model demands asymmetric bets; a 10% chance at a 100x return is superior to a risky 3x, as both could result in a zero. Venture is not private equity.

For a megafund like Andreessen Horowitz's $15B vehicle to generate venture returns, it must consistently capture a significant market share—roughly 10%—of all successful outcomes. This transforms their investment strategy into a game of market share acquisition across all stages, not just picking individual winners.

Most VC funds fail to generate meaningful returns for LPs. Only the top quartile consistently delivers performance that justifies the risk. The asset class as a whole underperforms, challenging the idea that broader retail access would be beneficial.

A multi-billion dollar exit's impact is relative to fund construction. For a concentrated Series A fund (30 companies), a $20B exit is a "Grand Slam." For a diversified seed fund (300 companies), the same exit is just a "Home Run" because it needs a 200x return, not a 30x, to be a true "fund returner."

The standard VC heuristic—that each investment must potentially return the entire fund—is strained by hyper-valuations. For a company raising at ~$200M, a typical fund needs a 60x return, meaning a $12 billion exit is the minimum for the investment to be a success, not a grand slam.

Bill Maris argues that smaller funds (<$750M) consistently outperform larger ones due to simple math. A multi-billion-dollar fund needs to return a value that can exceed the entire annual VC-backed exit market to achieve a 3x return. Smaller funds have more achievable targets and can offer founders more focused support.

Mega-fund math rarely clears a four-X net target | RiffOn