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When Applovin's stock plummeted despite strong fundamentals, CEO Adam Foroughi ceased investor relations. Instead, he used the company's massive cash flow to execute an aggressive $6B stock buyback, turning a market crisis into a huge value-creation opportunity by retiring 20-25% of the company's shares.
Henry Singleton viewed aggressive share repurchases as a superior investment to acquisitions or internal projects when Teledyne's stock was cheap. He controversially bought back 90% of the company's shares, generating a 42% compound annual return on the tenders.
When Applovin's stock fell 92%, the market signaled the business was doomed. The CEO's most critical job was to maintain and project internal conviction in a new, bold strategy (rebuilding their core tech). This confidence was essential to rally the team and retain the key talent needed for a turnaround.
After a highly successful period of buying back stock at low valuations (around 10x EBITDA), AppLovin's management continued the program at much higher prices (up to 40x EBITDA). These later buybacks are now underwater, illustrating the danger of price-insensitive repurchase programs.
To realign with investors after a 92% stock drop, Applovin's CEO took his first major compensation package. It was structured so he would only get paid if the stock recovered significantly from its all-time low, creating massive personal upside directly tied to shareholder value creation.
To combat plummeting morale as Applovin's stock fell 92%, CEO Adam Foroughi fostered an "us against the world" culture. He stopped talking to external investors and implemented a performance stock plan for key employees, not just the CEO, aligning them with the company's long-term recovery and rewarding their loyalty.
Facing a 92% stock price collapse, AppLovin leveraged its strong cash flow to become its own best investor. They paused investor relations and deployed every available dollar to buy back shares, confident that their internal technology rebuild (Axon 2) would fuel a massive recovery.
Most buybacks fail, but Applovin's was a huge success. Instead of buying shares on the open market, they identified large, known sellers on their private cap table who needed liquidity. They used their capital to directly absorb this selling pressure, stabilizing the stock for new, long-term investors.
During a market crash, Henry Singleton stopped acquiring companies and did the opposite: he used cash to buy back 90% of Teledyne's stock. While Wall Street saw this as failure, it was a rational trade—repurchasing his own company's earnings at a low multiple—which caused earnings per share to explode.
Companies termed "share cannibals" aggressively repurchase their own shares, especially when undervalued. This capital allocation strategy is often superior to dividends because it transfers value from sellers to long-term shareholders and acts as a high-return, low-risk investment in the company's own business.
Jonathan Tepper views aggressive share buybacks during market downturns as a hallmark of a superior CEO. Unlike managers who buy back shares when things are good and the stock is high, great capital allocators like Booking.com's CEO seize moments of market fear to repurchase shares at a discount, creating significant long-term value.