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Most buybacks fail, but Applovin's was a huge success. Instead of buying shares on the open market, they identified large, known sellers on their private cap table who needed liquidity. They used their capital to directly absorb this selling pressure, stabilizing the stock for new, long-term investors.
To capitalize on its deep discount to NAV, Exor employed a sophisticated reverse Dutch auction for share buybacks. This allowed the company to repurchase €1 billion in shares at the lowest prices offered by shareholders, maximizing value accretion.
Instead of relying on venture-led secondary sales, Column uses 25% of its annual earnings to conduct its own tender offers. This provides regular liquidity to employees, enhances retention, and aligns the team long-term without the dilution from new funding rounds.
To realign with investors after a 92% stock drop, Applovin's CEO took his first major compensation package. It was structured so he would only get paid if the stock recovered significantly from its all-time low, creating massive personal upside directly tied to shareholder value creation.
Instead of engaging in a costly activist battle himself, Buffett practiced Sun Tzu's principle of 'winning without conflict'. He waited until activists like Icahn and Einhorn had pressured Apple's management to implement a shareholder-friendly buyback policy. Once the opportunity was 'perfected' by others, he deployed capital peacefully and massively.
Companies termed "share cannibals" aggressively repurchase their own shares, especially when undervalued. This capital allocation strategy is often superior to dividends because it transfers value from sellers to long-term shareholders and acts as a high-return, low-risk investment in the company's own business.
Profitable, self-funded public companies that consistently use surplus cash for share repurchases are effectively executing a slow-motion management buyout. This process systematically increases the ownership percentage for the remaining long-term shareholders who, alongside management, will eventually "own the whole company."
Fairfax executed a brilliant capital allocation move by selling a 10% stake in its subsidiary, Odyssey, to pension funds for 1.7 times its book value. They then used the billion-dollar proceeds to buy back their own undervalued parent company stock, which was trading at a discount of 0.9x book value.
When Front Office Sports realized an investor was a "buyer, not a strategic partner," they didn't wait. They proactively found a new, more aligned investor (Jeff Zucker's Redbird IMI) and engineered a deal to buy out the previous firm, providing them a return while freeing the company to pursue a more aggressive growth strategy.
A tender offer, where a company buys a large block of its stock in a set price range, signals higher conviction than a typical buyback program. It forces management to put a stake in the ground, indicating they believe the shares are significantly undervalued at a specific price.
Jonathan Tepper views aggressive share buybacks during market downturns as a hallmark of a superior CEO. Unlike managers who buy back shares when things are good and the stock is high, great capital allocators like Booking.com's CEO seize moments of market fear to repurchase shares at a discount, creating significant long-term value.