Extensive historical data reveals two primary predictors of a central bank causing high inflation: frequent, politically motivated turnover of its leadership and the direct purchase of government bonds from the treasury. Other supposed indicators of independence have less predictive power.
Related Insights
Rajan suggests that a central bank's reluctance to aggressively fight inflation may stem from a fear of being blamed for a potential recession. In a politically charged environment, the institutional risk of becoming the 'fall guy' can subtly influence policy, leading to a more dovish stance than economic data alone would suggest.
The Fed's recent rate cuts, despite strong economic indicators, are seen as a capitulation to political pressure. This suggests the central bank is now functioning as a "political utility" to manage government debt, marking a victory for political influence over its traditional independence.
JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon highlighted Turkey as a case study where political pressure to cut interest rates led to a collapse in confidence and crippling 80% inflation. This demonstrates that a central bank's independence from politics is critical for maintaining economic stability.
Increasing political influence, including presidential pressure and politically-aligned board appointments, is compromising the Federal Reserve's independence. This suggests future monetary policy may be more dovish than economic data warrants, as the Fed is pushed to prioritize short-term growth ahead of elections.
Rajan argues that a central bank's independence is not guaranteed by its structure but by the political consensus supporting it. When political polarization increases, institutions like the Fed become vulnerable to pressure, as their supposed autonomy is only as strong as the political will to uphold it.
As the Federal Reserve becomes more aligned with the executive branch, its traditional mandate to control inflation independently weakens. Consequently, voters may start holding the incumbent political party directly responsible for rising prices, making inflation a key electoral issue rather than a purely monetary one.
Ongoing political pressure, including attempts to remove a governor and uncertainty over the next Fed Chair, is perceived as a threat to the Federal Reserve's independence. This political risk is a key factor leading to the view that inflation break-evens are too low and their risks are skewed to the upside.
The Federal Reserve's independence is crucial for long-term economic stability because it prevents presidents from succumbing to the political temptation of lowering interest rates for short-term popularity, a move that risks spiraling inflation.
Despite the perception of independence, the Federal Reserve historically yields to political pressure from the White House. Every US president, regardless of party, has ultimately obtained the monetary policy they desired, a pattern that has held true since the Fed's creation.
In periods of 'fiscal dominance,' where government debt and deficits are high, a central bank's independence inevitably erodes. Its primary function shifts from controlling inflation to ensuring the government can finance its spending, often through financial repression like yield curve control.
