The Bank of Japan's decision to hold rates, perceived as politically motivated, causes it to fall further "behind the curve" on inflation. This inaction could erode market confidence to the point where even future hawkish communications are ignored, suggesting the central bank is losing control of the market narrative.

Rajan suggests that a central bank's reluctance to aggressively fight inflation may stem from a fear of being blamed for a potential recession. In a politically charged environment, the institutional risk of becoming the 'fall guy' can subtly influence policy, leading to a more dovish stance than economic data alone would suggest.

The Fed's recent rate cuts, despite strong economic indicators, are seen as a capitulation to political pressure. This suggests the central bank is now functioning as a "political utility" to manage government debt, marking a victory for political influence over its traditional independence.

Increasing political influence, including presidential pressure and politically-aligned board appointments, is compromising the Federal Reserve's independence. This suggests future monetary policy may be more dovish than economic data warrants, as the Fed is pushed to prioritize short-term growth ahead of elections.

Rajan argues that a central bank's independence is not guaranteed by its structure but by the political consensus supporting it. When political polarization increases, institutions like the Fed become vulnerable to pressure, as their supposed autonomy is only as strong as the political will to uphold it.

Despite intense political criticism, a coalition including former Fed chairs, Treasury secretaries from both parties, and major bank CEOs has publicly defended the central bank's independence. This signals that markets view a non-politicized Fed as critical for economic stability, overriding political allegiances.

Ongoing political pressure, including attempts to remove a governor and uncertainty over the next Fed Chair, is perceived as a threat to the Federal Reserve's independence. This political risk is a key factor leading to the view that inflation break-evens are too low and their risks are skewed to the upside.

Alan Blinder notes that politicians, driven by electoral cycles, lack the will to use fiscal tools (like tax hikes or spending cuts) to cool an overheating economy. The last instance was in 1968 under President Johnson, underscoring why an independent central bank is the only reliable institutional defense against inflation.

The Federal Reserve's independence is crucial for long-term economic stability because it prevents presidents from succumbing to the political temptation of lowering interest rates for short-term popularity, a move that risks spiraling inflation.