In a market where spreads are tight and technicals prevent sustained sell-offs, making large directional bets is a poor strategy. The best approach is to stay close to benchmarks in terms of overall risk and allocate the risk budget to identifying specific winners and losers through deep, fundamental credit analysis.
Emerging market credit spreads are tightening while developed markets' are widening. This divergence is not a fundamental mispricing but is explained by unique, positive developments in specific sovereigns like post-election Argentina and bonds in Venezuela on hopes of restructuring.
A strategic divergence exists in EM corporate credit. Mandate-bound real money funds feel compelled to stay invested due to a lack of near-term negative catalysts, while more flexible hedge funds are actively taking short positions, betting that historically tight spreads will inevitably widen over the next 6-12 months.
The primary threat to the high-yield market isn't a wave of corporate defaults, but rather a reversion of the compressed risk premium that investors demand. This premium has been historically low, and a return to normal levels presents a significant valuation risk, even if fundamentals remain stable.
While default risk exists, the more pressing problem for credit investors is a severe supply-demand imbalance. A shortage of new M&A and corporate issuance, combined with massive sideline capital (e.g., $8T in money markets), keeps spreads historically tight and makes finding attractive opportunities the main challenge.
The dominance of low-cost index funds means active managers cannot compete in liquid, efficient markets. Survival depends on creating strategies in areas Vanguard can't easily replicate, such as illiquid micro-caps, niche geographies, or complex sectors that require specialized data and analysis.
The CCC-rated segment of the high-yield market should not be treated as a simple down-in-quality allocation. Instead, it's a "stock picker's" environment where opportunities are found in specific, idiosyncratic situations with high conviction, such as a turnaround story or a mispriced part of a company's capital structure.
In the current market, where valuations are tight, the potential return from being fully invested in high-yield is not compelling enough. Therefore, the opportunity cost of holding extra cash is low. This strategy allows for reserving liquidity (dry powder) to deploy opportunistically when dislocations or better entry points appear.
BlackRock's CIO of Global Fixed Income argues that unlike equities, fixed income is about consistently getting paid back. The optimal strategy is broad diversification—tilting odds slightly in your favor and repeating it—rather than making concentrated, high-conviction "bravado" bets on specific market segments.
Despite being at historically tight levels, EM sovereign credit spreads are unlikely to widen significantly from an EM-specific slowdown. The catalyst for a major sell-off would have to be a 'beta move' originating from a crisis in core US markets, such as equities or corporate credit, given the current strength of EM fundamentals.
The modern high-yield market is structurally different from its past. It's now composed of higher-quality issuers and has a shorter duration profile. While this limits potential upside returns compared to historical cycles, it also provides a cushion, capping the potential downside risk for investors.