The yield premium for private credit has shrunk, meaning investors are no longer adequately compensated for the additional illiquidity, concentration, and credit risk they assume. Publicly traded high-yield bonds and bank loans now offer comparable returns with better diversification and liquidity, questioning the rationale for allocating to private credit.

In 1935, amidst massive economic uncertainty following the Great Depression, a new AA-rated corporate bond yielded just 70 basis points over Treasurys. This historical precedent, nearly identical to today's spreads, shows that low credit spreads are not necessarily a sign of complacency and can persist even if economic conditions worsen, challenging typical risk-pricing assumptions.

The credit market appears healthy based on tight average spreads, but this is misleading. A strong top 90% of the market pulls the average down, while the bottom 10% faces severe distress, with loans "dropping like a stone." The weight of prolonged high borrowing costs is creating a clear divide between healthy and struggling companies.

While default risk exists, the more pressing problem for credit investors is a severe supply-demand imbalance. A shortage of new M&A and corporate issuance, combined with massive sideline capital (e.g., $8T in money markets), keeps spreads historically tight and makes finding attractive opportunities the main challenge.

In a market where everyone is chasing the same high-quality corporate bonds, driving premiums up, a defensive strategy is to pivot to Treasuries. They can offer comparable yields without the inflated premium or credit risk, providing a safe haven while waiting for better entry points in credit markets.

In bond investing, where upside is capped at a promised return, superior performance comes from what you exclude, not what you buy. The primary task is to eliminate the bonds that will default. Once those are removed, all the remaining performing bonds deliver a similar, contractually-fixed return.

Oaktree sees superior relative value in non-qualified residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). The US housing market is under-supplied with tight lending standards. This contrasts sharply with commercial real estate, particularly the office sector. Investors can acquire these non-government backed loans at a discount, offering high-yield-like returns with diversification.

In a market where spreads are tight and technicals prevent sustained sell-offs, making large directional bets is a poor strategy. The best approach is to stay close to benchmarks in terms of overall risk and allocate the risk budget to identifying specific winners and losers through deep, fundamental credit analysis.

Sectors that have experienced severe distress, like Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS), often present compelling opportunities. The crisis forces tighter lending standards and realistic asset repricing. This creates a safer investment environment for new capital, precisely because other investors remain fearful and avoid the sector.