Building a multi-strategy fund sequentially by adding 'satellite' strategies to a 'core' one is flawed. It signals to investors and potential hires that the new areas are non-essential, making it harder to attract top talent and leading to pressure to cut them during downturns.
Launching a multi-strategy firm with all core strategies at once is harder upfront but crucial for long-term success. A sequential build creates path dependency, where risk systems, technology, and culture become optimized for the initial strategy, making it difficult to integrate new, different strategies later.
Alan Waxman uses the term "tunnel investing" to describe the danger of single-strategy funds. By focusing only on their niche, they miss systemic risks visible from a broader perspective. He cites seeing the 2008 housing crisis brewing as an example of how a multi-strategy view provides crucial early warnings that specialists miss.
Many LPs focus solely on backing the 'best people.' However, a manager's chosen strategy and market (the 'neighborhood') is a more critical determinant of success. A brilliant manager playing a difficult game may underperform a good manager in a structurally advantaged area.
New private equity managers often define their strategy too broadly. The winning approach is to first dominate a narrow swim lane, like 'buy-and-builds of blue collar services,' to build credibility. They can then earn the right to expand into adjacent markets in later funds.
The primary risk to a VC fund's performance isn't its absolute size but rather a dramatic increase (e.g., doubling) from one fund to the next. This forces firms to change their strategy and write larger checks than their conviction muscle is built for.
Centerbridge initially sought investors equally skilled in PE and credit, a "switch hitter" model they found unrealistic. They evolved to a "majors and minors" approach, allowing professionals to specialize in one area while gaining significant experience in the other. This fosters deep expertise without sacrificing the firm's integrated strategy.
When expanding a fund's investment thesis, avoid making multiple changes simultaneously, such as moving from venture to growth stage AND from software to hardware. Making more than one 'leap' at a time dramatically increases risk and magnifies blind spots. Instead, change one variable at a time, like moving to a later stage within a familiar sector, to manage risk effectively.
A pure TPA system can alienate specialists hired for specific asset classes. A hybrid model, where a portion of capital is allocated to traditional buckets, allows organizations to retain deep expertise in areas like private equity while still gaining the benefits of a holistic TPA overlay on the rest.
While limited partners in venture funds often claim to seek differentiated strategies, in reality, they prefer minor deviations from established models. They want the comfort of the familiar with a slight "alpha" twist, making it difficult for managers with genuinely unconventional approaches to raise institutional capital.
Separating investment teams by stage (seed, growth, public) creates misaligned incentives and arbitrary knowledge silos. A unified, multi-stage team can focus only on the handful of companies that truly matter, follow them across their entire lifecycle, and "never miss" an opportunity, even if the entry point changes.