An innovation arm's performance isn't its "batting average." If a team pursues truly ambitious, "exotic" opportunities, a high failure rate is an expected and even positive signal. An overly high success rate suggests the team is only taking safe, incremental bets, defeating its purpose.

The most effective government role in innovation is to act as a catalyst for high-risk, foundational R&D (like DARPA creating the internet). Once a technology is viable, the government should step aside to allow private sector competition (like SpaceX) to drive down costs and accelerate progress.

In-Q-Tel, a nonprofit VC associated with the CIA, provides the early-stage equity funding that breakthrough technologies need to survive. This model successfully addresses a market failure where traditional VCs won't invest and government loans are unsuitable for tech startups.

While investing in government-supported sectors like AI and semiconductors seems safe, it's a long-term risk. A government's priority is political—winning elections and preserving jobs—which will eventually conflict with an investor's goal of maximizing profit, leading to poor returns as seen in China.

A regulator who approves a new technology that fails faces immense public backlash and career ruin. Conversely, they receive little glory for a success. This asymmetric risk profile creates a powerful incentive to deny or delay new innovations, preserving the status quo regardless of potential benefits.

Breakthrough technology companies in strategic sectors are often too risky for traditional VC but cannot sustain the debt-based instruments offered by most government programs. This creates a specific "equity valley of death" that stifles innovation in critical areas like rare earths.

To rebuild its industrial base at speed, the US government must abandon its typical strategy of funding many small players. Instead, it should identify and place huge bets on a handful of trusted, patriotic entrepreneurs, giving them the scale, offtake agreements, and backing necessary to compete globally.

Instead of ineffective grants to incumbents, the US should leverage its world-leading capital markets. By providing lightweight government backstops for private bank loans—absorbing partial default risk—it can de-risk private investment and unlock the massive capital needed for new factories without distorting market incentives.

The public sector's aversion to risk is driven by the constant external threat of audits and public hearings from bodies like the GAO and Congress. This compliance-focused environment stifles innovation and discourages the "measured risk" taking necessary to attract modern tech talent who thrive on cutting-edge work.