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Sameer Dholakia compares venture to other maturing industries: as it professionalizes, winners consolidate into giant global platforms or narrowly specialized firms. He says being a mid-sized generalist in between is a rough place to make money, and he is glad not to run a billion-dollar fund caught there.

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The private markets industry is bifurcating. General Partners (GPs) must either scale massively with broad distribution to sell multiple products, or focus on a highly differentiated, unique strategy. The middle ground—being a mid-sized, undifferentiated firm—is becoming the most difficult position to defend.

Venture capital is shifting from specialized stage-specific funds to "full stack" firms that offer dedicated seed, venture, and growth capital. This allows one firm to support a company throughout its entire private lifecycle, a structural response to longer private market timelines.

As the PE landscape became saturated with generalist firms, differentiation became crucial. Sector-specialist firms gained an edge by leveraging deep industry knowledge to win deals, often without offering the highest price. This hyper-focus, born from necessity, creates a durable competitive advantage.

Andreessen's firm was built on the thesis that VC would follow the same 'death of the middle' trajectory as Hollywood agencies and investment banks. This results in a barbell market with small, specialized seed funds on one end and large, multi-service platforms on the other, squeezing out mid-sized firms.

The venture asset class is maturing into two dominant, successful models. The first is the founder-centric firm that invests at formation and builds deep intimacy. The second is the massive platform player whose brand grants access to late-stage consensus deals. Firms trying to operate in the middle are structurally disadvantaged and fragile.

Venture capital has become a scaled, specialized business with large teams. The future, however, belongs to compact firms of well-rounded individuals who can source, exercise judgment, sell, and help companies. Over-specialization where one person sources and another helps is an inefficient model.

The idea that venture is splitting into giant platforms and tiny boutiques is flawed. A16z, the largest platform, is structured as a collection of specialized, boutique-sized funds. This model proves that focused, sector-specific funds are the effective unit, even within a mega-firm.

In venture capital, mid-sized generalist funds struggle to compete. They lack the scale and network of large generalists and the deep expertise of small specialists. This 'death of the middle' makes it difficult for them to win the best, most competitive deals against firms that can offer either breadth or depth.

The venture capital landscape is bifurcating. Large, multi-stage funds leverage scale and network, while small, boutique funds win with deep domain expertise. Mid-sized generalist funds lack a clear competitive edge and risk getting squeezed out by these two dominant models.

True alpha in venture capital is found at the extremes. It's either in being a "market maker" at the earliest stages by shaping a raw idea, or by writing massive, late-stage checks where few can compete. The competitive, crowded middle-stages offer less opportunity for outsized returns.

Venture firms must be global platforms or extreme specialists | RiffOn