Unlike the US, where shareholder activism is common, UK culture discourages confrontation, described as not wanting to "raise your head above the parapet." This cultural barrier contributes to board and management complacency, allowing undervaluation to persist without challenge.

Daniel Gladys argues that as passive investing grows, fewer participants focus on fundamentals. This widens the gap between a stock's price and its intrinsic value, creating a favorable environment for disciplined value investors who can identify these overlooked opportunities.

As passive index funds dominate markets, they become massive but indifferent shareholders. Unlike fundamental investors, they vote proxies based on institutional safety ("CYA") or political agendas, not on what maximizes a specific company's value, which fundamentally warps corporate governance.

The number of public companies has nearly halved since the 90s, concentrating capital into fewer assets. This scarcity, combined with passive funds locking up float, creates structural imbalances. Sophisticated retail traders can now identify these situations and trigger gamma squeezes, challenging institutional dominance.

For a large fund, selling a $2B position and buying a replacement is a $4B transaction with significant market impact. This illiquidity incentivizes working with a company's board and management to solve problems rather than incurring the high cost of divesting, turning large passive investors into de facto activists.

Despite the massive growth of retail investing, politicians rarely campaign on platforms that directly address the interests of shareholders as a distinct societal group. This contrasts with other economic groups, leaving a large and financially significant portion of the population without direct political representation for their investments.

Passive funds from firms like Vanguard and Blackrock outsource their proxy voting to advisors like ISS. These advisors advocate for shareholder primacy in ways that are often inversely correlated with long-term value creation, distorting corporate governance at a massive scale.

Rather than passively holding, Julian Robertson directly engaged with the management of his portfolio companies, such as Ford. He wrote letters challenging their capital allocation decisions, advocating for share buybacks over low-return acquisitions to unlock shareholder value.

Contrary to the traditional focus on institutional investors, allocating a significant portion of an IPO to retail investors creates a loyal shareholder base. This "retail following" can result in higher valuation multiples and sustained brand advocacy, turning customers into long-term owners and a strategic asset.