Rather than passively holding, Julian Robertson directly engaged with the management of his portfolio companies, such as Ford. He wrote letters challenging their capital allocation decisions, advocating for share buybacks over low-return acquisitions to unlock shareholder value.
Activists can be effective even in companies with dual-class shares or founder control. The mechanism for influence is not the threat of a proxy fight but the power of good ideas and relationships to achieve strategic alignment with the controlling party.
Julian Robertson's "story-based" investing wasn't about speculative narratives. It was a framework to ensure an investment thesis, like the supply-demand dynamics of copper, was logical and easily understood. If the core logic changed, the investment itself had to change.
Instead of engaging in a costly activist battle himself, Buffett practiced Sun Tzu's principle of 'winning without conflict'. He waited until activists like Icahn and Einhorn had pressured Apple's management to implement a shareholder-friendly buyback policy. Once the opportunity was 'perfected' by others, he deployed capital peacefully and massively.
Buffett’s legendary Apple investment came only after activists like Carl Icahn had already pressured the company into large-scale buybacks. He patiently waited for others to fix the company’s capital allocation flaws, entering the investment only after it was "perfected." This strategy allowed him to win without engaging in the initial conflict.
A common activist trap is 'ambulance chasing'—looking for problems to fix. ValueAct argues the correct sequence is to first identify a great company with a differentiated investment thesis. The need for influence is secondary, preventing adverse selection.
Robertson managed the Tiger Fund with a centralized, "queen bee" decision-making style. This approach, successful at a smaller scale, became a critical failure point as assets grew past $20 billion, highlighting the necessity of evolving leadership and delegating responsibility during rapid growth.
Profitable, self-funded public companies that consistently use surplus cash for share repurchases are effectively executing a slow-motion management buyout. This process systematically increases the ownership percentage for the remaining long-term shareholders who, alongside management, will eventually "own the whole company."
Instead of complaining that its stock trades at a steep discount to its net asset value (NAV), Exor's management pragmatically views this as a chance to invest in themselves. They trimmed their highly appreciated Ferrari stake specifically to fund share buybacks at this significant discount.
Exor's governance model focuses on finding the right leaders and then giving them space to execute. They review plans and organizational structures but avoid micromanagement, viewing their role as a supportive yet challenging partner to the CEOs of their portfolio companies.
In a market dominated by short-term traders and passive indexers, companies crave long-duration shareholders. Firms that hold positions for 5-10 years and focus on long-term strategy gain a competitive edge through better access to management, as companies are incentivized to engage with stable partners over transient capital.