In the 1970s, the prevailing culture was that software should be free and openly shared. Gates's deeply contrarian vision was to build a "software factory," creating an entirely new business model based on the conviction that the demand for high-quality, paid software would become nearly unlimited.
Matt Mullenweg observes a predictable cycle where technology swings from open to proprietary and back. When proprietary systems become too profitable and user-hostile, it creates a market opportunity for open-source alternatives to emerge and capture disillusioned customers.
Initially, Microsoft's go-to-market strategy was not to displace competitors but to displace customers' own internal development teams. They framed their software's price as a fraction of a company's fixed in-house engineering budget, a powerful value proposition that defined a new category of B2B sales.
A core tenet of Gates's management philosophy was extreme financial conservatism. He insisted on keeping enough cash in the bank to cover all expenses for a full year, even if revenue dropped to zero. This survival-focused mindset provided a massive strategic advantage and independence from outside capital.
Oracle founder and fierce competitor Larry Ellison believed that while many people were smarter than Bill Gates, almost no one could match his relentless focus and endurance. This singular drive, not just raw intelligence, was the key differentiator that allowed Gates to dominate the software industry.
Bill Gates and Paul Allen deliberately hired young, enthusiastic programmers, often straight from university with bachelor's degrees. They believed it was better to get talent "before they were ruined by working somewhere else." This strategy allowed them to mold a unique, high-intensity engineering culture from scratch.
History shows that transformative innovations like airlines, vaccines, and PCs, while beneficial to society, often fail to create sustained, concentrated shareholder value as they become commoditized. This suggests the massive valuations in AI may be misplaced, with the technology's benefits accruing more to users than investors in the long run.
The most profound innovations in history, like vaccines, PCs, and air travel, distributed value broadly to society rather than being captured by a few corporations. AI could follow this pattern, benefiting the public more than a handful of tech giants, especially with geopolitical pressures forcing commoditization.
Gates employed a zero-sum competitive mindset. He believed losing a $50,000 contract wasn't just a $50k loss for Microsoft, but a $100,000 negative swing because the competitor gained that same amount. This mental model fueled his ruthless drive to not just win, but to eliminate opponents from the market.
After early failures, Orlando Bravo pioneered software buyouts. This was a contrarian move, as the prevailing view was that these companies were either too old or too risky. This niche focus on making unprofitable software businesses viable became the foundation of his firm's success.
When evaluating revolutionary ideas, traditional Total Addressable Market (TAM) analysis is useless. VCs should instead bet on founders with a "world-bending vision" capable of inducing a new market, not just capturing an existing one. Have the humility to admit you can't predict market size and instead back the visionary founder.