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Miles Dieffenbach asks whether a GP puts own cash into the fund and would feel real pain if it underperforms. He contrasts that with managers collecting $30M in fees while holding a free call option on LP money: heads they win, tails LPs pay. It is his cleanest alignment test.

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A core incentive misalignment exists between VCs (GPs) and their investors (LPs). GPs are punished for errors of omission (missing a generational company), driving risk-taking. LPs are punished for errors of commission (backing a public failure), encouraging risk-aversion and conservatism.

The strength of a GP-LP relationship isn't measured by co-invest rights or fee breaks. It's demonstrated when a GP offers valuable advice or connections that improve the LP's overall portfolio, even when there's no direct financial gain for the GP. This uncompensated help is the hallmark of true partnership.

Large venture funds generating substantial management fees can become misaligned with founders. Their behavior may shift to prioritize fee generation over maximizing returns, whereas smaller, specialized firms' success is more directly tied to their portfolio companies winning.

When selecting new GPs to back, Brian Singerman uses a powerful heuristic: could this person, playing their own unique game, have beaten him at his peak as a VC? This test cuts through superficial metrics to identify raw, world-class talent, irrespective of their specific investment strategy.

Unlike traditional VC funds motivated by carry, USVC's fee is based on assets under management. However, because it's a public product with quarterly redemptions, poor performance will lead to investor withdrawals and reputational damage, forcing a focus on strong returns.

The legendary investor calls venture capital's business model a "scam" because VCs get paid management fees regardless of performance. He argues this structure incentivizes deploying capital even on overly risky bets, as the manager's personal downside is limited while their upside is significant.

Davis explains that managers without personal capital invested are tempted to follow hot trends, akin to trusting a "blind monkey pointing at winning stocks." Because his family's wealth is in the funds, he maintains discipline to ignore momentum—even when it's working—and focus on underlying business value, proving that alignment is a powerful defense against irrationality.

To ensure "radical alignment," solo capitalist Oren Zeev pays himself zero from management fees, reinvesting 100% back into his funds. As the largest LP in every fund and with a 30% carry, his entire economic incentive is tied to long-term value creation, not fee generation, which is highly unusual.

Oren Zeev advises LPs to gauge the reality of a fund's paper returns by assessing the GP's motivation. A secure, top-tier fund has every reason to be conservative with marks. A less-established fund, needing to fundraise, is highly motivated to use any available methodology to keep valuations high on paper.

Founders Fund's perk allowing employees to co-invest personally is a clever mechanism to test true conviction. If an investor sponsoring a deal is unwilling to put their own money in, it raises a serious question about their belief in the investment's potential, forcing them to justify why it's a better allocation for LPs than their own capital.

Skin in the game separates real VCs from tourists | RiffOn