Navan's post-IPO stock drop, despite strong revenue, is a troubling sign for the venture ecosystem. It highlights that even a multi-billion-dollar outcome can be considered a 'bummer' and may not generate sufficient returns for large, late-stage funds, resetting expectations for what constitutes a truly successful exit in the current market.

For a megafund like Andreessen Horowitz's $15B vehicle to generate venture returns, it must consistently capture a significant market share—roughly 10%—of all successful outcomes. This transforms their investment strategy into a game of market share acquisition across all stages, not just picking individual winners.

A multi-billion dollar exit's impact is relative to fund construction. For a concentrated Series A fund (30 companies), a $20B exit is a "Grand Slam." For a diversified seed fund (300 companies), the same exit is just a "Home Run" because it needs a 200x return, not a 30x, to be a true "fund returner."

Sequoia Capital's Roloff Botha calculates that with ~$250 billion invested into venture capital annually, the industry needs to generate nearly $1 trillion in returns for investors. This translates to a staggering $1.5 trillion in total company exit value every year, a figure that is difficult to imagine materializing consistently.

A counterargument to bearish VC math posits that the majority of the $250B annual deployment is late-stage private equity, not true early-stage venture. The actual venture segment (~$25B/year) only needs ~$150B in exits, a goal achievable with just one 'centicorn' (like OpenAI) and a handful of decacorn outcomes annually.

The standard VC heuristic—that each investment must potentially return the entire fund—is strained by hyper-valuations. For a company raising at ~$200M, a typical fund needs a 60x return, meaning a $12 billion exit is the minimum for the investment to be a success, not a grand slam.

The venture capital industry invests $150-200B annually. To generate reasonable returns (3.5-4x), it needs over $700B in exit value each year. This translates to an unrealistic 40 exits of Figma's scale ($25B) annually, making VC a "return-free risk" for most limited partners.

The venture capital return model has shifted so dramatically that even some multi-billion-dollar exits are insufficient. This forces VCs to screen for 'immortal' founders capable of building $10B+ companies from inception, making traditionally solid businesses run by 'mortal founders' increasingly uninvestable by top funds.

VC outcomes aren't a bell curve; a tiny fraction of investments deliver exponential returns covering all losses. This 'power law' dynamic means VCs must hunt for massive outliers, not just 'good' companies. Thiel only invests in startups with the potential to return his whole fund.