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Because tens of thousands of chemical compounds exist and morph across production steps, data opacity frequently stalls policy action. Rather than waiting for flawless industry data, governments should publish an imperfect critical chemicals list. Similar to the 2018 US critical minerals list, publishing a clear catalog of priorities serves as a galvanizing mechanism that focuses public-private collaboration and directs targeted industrial policy.

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Instead of broad subsidies across all critical minerals, a more effective strategy is to target the ~25 materials that China has explicitly used as leverage through export controls. This "power law" approach concentrates capital on acute vulnerabilities identified by China's own actions, rather than diluting it across a wide, less-critical list.

Coarse production and trade classifications leave governments with incomplete mapping of chemical dependencies across tens of thousands of compounds. However, private manufacturers cannot afford to pause risk mitigation. Companies can act immediately through everyday procurement processes by repricing geopolitical risk and qualifying secondary suppliers across known high-exposure sectors such as pharmaceuticals, defense inputs, agricultural fertilizers, and advanced electronics.

China's export ban on rare earth metals, critical for everything from iPhones to fighter jets, exposes a major US vulnerability. The solution is to treat domestic mining like vaccine development—a national security priority that requires fast-tracking the typical 30-year regulatory process for opening new mines.

A "plugging holes" approach focused solely on raw materials is strategically flawed. China is replicating its dominance in downstream sectors like battery cells and chemicals—the "connective tissue" of manufacturing. Without a holistic strategy, the West risks solving one dependency only to face another, more complex one.

A complete national industrial strategy requires a dual approach. It needs large, congressionally-approved programs for trillion-dollar sectors like semiconductors, paired with a smaller, more flexible fund to quickly address emerging choke points in smaller markets like rare earths or APIs without new legislation each time.

Government intervention is most effective when targeting industries that meet three criteria: they must be critical to national security or the economy, compromised by foreign dependence or choke points, and fundamentally changeable through targeted financial incentives that can shift their long-term economics.

Although aggregate capital flows into chemicals are rising, between 75% and 80% of activity consists of mergers and acquisitions rather than venture capital, private equity, or greenfield capacity. Corporate consolidation fails to fund novel chemistry startups or build resilient alternative production facilities. This capital misallocation leaves strategic supply chains exposed because investment is not channeled toward the technological edges that drive long-term diversification.

Rare earths are widely recognized as critical mineral vulnerabilities, but the bottlenecks restricting Western access are fundamentally chemical in nature. Essential refining steps like leaching and chemical separation constitute the core technology stack that China dominates. Framing rare earth supply chain risks solely as mining or extraction issues overlooks the reality that critical mineral security is gated by upstream chemical processing capabilities.

A major obstacle to securing U.S. supply chains is a deliberate lack of data. The government has avoided mandating data collection on critical dependencies, like pharmaceutical ingredients from China, out of deference to industry. This prevents policymakers from even understanding the extent of their vulnerabilities.

The U.S. reactively chases news headlines (like rare earths) without a rigorous framework to identify its most critical dependencies. Policymakers have not prioritized whether to secure wartime supply chains or mitigate China's leverage over consumer goods that could spark domestic political crises.