By banning only *new models* of foreign drones, the FCC is signaling a long-term protected market for U.S. manufacturers. This gradual approach acknowledges that the current domestic industry is uncompetitive and needs time and incentive to scale up to compete with firms like DJI.

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Instead of a total ban, a more strategic approach is to "slow ball" an adversary like China by providing them with just enough technology. This keeps them dependent on foreign suppliers and disincentivizes the massive state investment required to develop their own superior, independent solutions.

The decision to allow NVIDIA to sell powerful AI chips to China has a counterintuitive goal. The administration believes that by supplying China, it can "take the air out" of the country's own efforts to build a self-sufficient AI chip ecosystem, thereby hindering domestic firms like Huawei.

By coining the term 'low altitude economy,' China is signaling a deliberate, top-down industrial strategy to own the market for autonomous flying vehicles (EVTOLs) and delivery drones. This isn't just about a single company; it's about creating and regulating a new economic sector to establish a global manufacturing and operational lead.

The current trade friction is part of a larger, long-term bipartisan U.S. strategy of "competitive confrontation." This involves not just tariffs but also significant domestic investment, like the CHIPS Act, to build resilient supply chains and reduce reliance on China for critical industries, a trend expected to persist across administrations.

While China bans many US tech giants, it welcomed Tesla. A compelling theory suggests this was a strategic move to observe and learn Tesla's methods for mass-producing EVs at scale, thereby accelerating the development of domestic champions like BYD, mirroring its past strategy with Apple's iPhone.

Unlike the U.S. government's recent strategy of backing single "champions" like Intel, China's successful industrial policy in sectors like EVs involves funding numerous competing companies. This state-fostered domestic competition is a key driver of their rapid innovation and market dominance.

To gain corporate buy-in for its security agenda, Japan's government combines protective measures like export controls with promotional incentives like R&D support. This 'run faster' strategy reframes national security regulations from being a restrictive cost into a direct opportunity for innovation and expansion in strategic sectors.

U.S. export controls on advanced semiconductors, intended to slow China, have instead galvanized its domestic industry. The restrictions accelerated China's existing push for self-sufficiency, forcing local companies to innovate with less advanced chips and develop their own GPU and manufacturing capabilities, diminishing the policy's long-term effectiveness.

The long-standing American political consensus favoring lower trade barriers has been replaced. Industrial policy, with active government shaping of key sectors via tariffs and investment, is now a durable, bipartisan strategy seen under both Trump and Biden administrations.

Historically, the FCC regulated media ownership and radio waves with national security in mind. This function was shelved in the 1990s with the rise of the WTO. Recent actions signal a deliberate effort to revive this legacy and reposition the FCC as a key player in U.S. national security policy.