Historically, the FCC regulated media ownership and radio waves with national security in mind. This function was shelved in the 1990s with the rise of the WTO. Recent actions signal a deliberate effort to revive this legacy and reposition the FCC as a key player in U.S. national security policy.
By banning only *new models* of foreign drones, the FCC is signaling a long-term protected market for U.S. manufacturers. This gradual approach acknowledges that the current domestic industry is uncompetitive and needs time and incentive to scale up to compete with firms like DJI.
While critics label over-the-air broadcasting as obsolete, PBS frames it as essential national infrastructure. It serves as the backup for the country's emergency alert system, providing a resilient "one-to-many" communication channel that reaches rural and low-income populations when digital systems fail or are overwhelmed, thus reframing a weakness as a key public service.
The Trump administration's strategy for control isn't writing new authoritarian laws, but aggressively using latent executive authority that past administrations ignored. This demonstrates how a democracy's own structures can be turned against it without passing a single new piece of legislation, as seen with the FCC.
The US government revived the name "Operation Gatekeeper," once used for a 90s border project, for a new mission: cracking down on illegal AI chip smuggling to China. This demonstrates how semiconductors have become a national security priority on par with physical border control.
The AI systems used for mass censorship were not created for social media. They began as military and intelligence projects (DARPA, CIA, NSA) to track terrorists and foreign threats, then were pivoted to target domestic political narratives after the 2016 election.
FCC Chairman Brendan Carr is reversing decades of deregulation by reasserting control over broadcast TV content while maintaining a hands-off approach to the internet. This creates a free speech double standard where the delivery mechanism, not the content, determines government scrutiny, targeting weaker legacy media.
To circumvent First Amendment protections, the national security state framed unwanted domestic political speech as a "foreign influence operation." This national security justification was the legal hammer used to involve agencies like the CIA in moderating content on domestic social media platforms.
To address national security concerns, the plan for TikTok's U.S. entity involves not just data localization but retraining its content algorithm exclusively on U.S. user data. This novel approach aims to create a firewall against potential foreign manipulation of the content feed, going a step beyond simple data storage solutions.
While both the Biden administration's pressure on YouTube and Trump's threats against ABC are anti-free speech, the former is more insidious. Surreptitious, behind-the-scenes censorship is harder to identify and fight publicly, making it a greater threat to open discourse than loud, transparent attacks that can be openly condemned.
The modern concentration of media power isn't a recent phenomenon. It was formalized during WWII when the Pentagon centralized control over radio, print, and Hollywood for propaganda purposes. This government-media relationship persisted and expanded through Cold War intelligence operations like Project Mockingbird.