Alan Blinder notes that politicians, driven by electoral cycles, lack the will to use fiscal tools (like tax hikes or spending cuts) to cool an overheating economy. The last instance was in 1968 under President Johnson, underscoring why an independent central bank is the only reliable institutional defense against inflation.
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Rajan suggests that a central bank's reluctance to aggressively fight inflation may stem from a fear of being blamed for a potential recession. In a politically charged environment, the institutional risk of becoming the 'fall guy' can subtly influence policy, leading to a more dovish stance than economic data alone would suggest.
The Fed's recent rate cuts, despite strong economic indicators, are seen as a capitulation to political pressure. This suggests the central bank is now functioning as a "political utility" to manage government debt, marking a victory for political influence over its traditional independence.
Recent inflation was primarily driven by fiscal spending, not the bank-lending credit booms of the 1970s. The Fed’s main tool—raising interest rates—is designed to curb bank lending. This creates a mismatch where the Fed is slowing the private sector to counteract a problem created by the public sector.
While political pressure on the Federal Reserve is notable, the central bank's shift towards rate cuts is grounded in economic data. Decelerating employment and signs of increasing labor market slack provide a solid, data-driven justification for their policy recalibration, independent of political influence.
Due to massive government debt, the Fed's tools work paradoxically. Raising rates increases the deficit via higher interest payments, which is stimulative. Cutting rates is also inherently stimulative. The Fed is no longer controlling inflation but merely choosing the path through which it occurs.
Since 2014-2015, the Federal Reserve's actions have not materially impacted the economy's flow of funds. The intense market focus on Fed announcements is a distraction from the true economic driver: fiscal policy. Analysis should sideline the Fed to gain a clearer picture of the economy.
'Fiscal dominance' occurs when government spending, not central bank policy, dictates the economy. In this state, the Federal Reserve's actions, like interest rate cuts, become largely ineffective for long-term stability. They can create short-term sentiment shifts but cannot overcome the overwhelming force of massive government deficit spending.
Alan Blinder argues that financial markets are severely underpricing the risk of political interference at the Federal Reserve. He cites the President's attempt to remove a governor and political appointments as clear threats that defy historical norms, calling it "one of the biggest underreactions" he's ever seen.
The U.S. government's debt is so large that the Federal Reserve is trapped. Raising interest rates would trigger a government default, while cutting them would further inflate the 'everything bubble.' Either path leads to a systemic crisis, a situation economists call 'fiscal dominance.'
In periods of 'fiscal dominance,' where government debt and deficits are high, a central bank's independence inevitably erodes. Its primary function shifts from controlling inflation to ensuring the government can finance its spending, often through financial repression like yield curve control.
