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The UK's student loan system is more punitive for lower earners than a true regressive tax. High earners eventually pay off their loans and stop contributing, whereas in a tax system, they would pay forever, which would lower the repayment percentage required from everyone else.

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When the government guaranteed student loans, it removed the risk for colleges. This allowed them to hike tuition prices unchecked, knowing students had access to funding. The resulting flood of graduates has also made a college degree less of a differentiator in the job market.

The student debt crisis is less about the cost of college and more about the failure to graduate. The vast majority of a degree's economic benefit is realized only upon completion. Attending college without graduating is a poor investment, making completion rates a more critical focus for policy than enrollment.

Underfunding the IRS is not a neutral act but a policy choice that disproportionately benefits the rich. Auditing complex, high-value returns requires significant resources. A weakened IRS cannot effectively pursue wealthy tax evaders, creating a massive "tax gap" that functions as a stealth tax cut for the top earners.

Deficit spending acts as a hidden tax via inflation. This tax disproportionately harms those without assets while benefiting the small percentage of the population owning assets like stocks and real estate. Therefore, supporting deficit spending is an active choice to make the rich richer and the poor poorer.

Runaway costs in education, housing, and healthcare stem from government intervention. When the government promises to provide a service (e.g., student loans), it becomes a massive "buy-only" force with no price sensitivity, eliminating natural market forces and causing costs to balloon.

For graduates who are not high earners, making early student loan repayments is illogical. Since their debt is likely to be written off after 30 years anyway, any extra payments are essentially wasted money that could have been saved for emergencies. This strategy only benefits top earners.

To fix the student debt crisis, universities should be financially on the hook for the first portion of any loan default (e.g., $20,000). This "first loss" position would compel them to underwrite the economic viability of their own degrees, creating a powerful market check against pushing students into overpriced and low-value programs.

The US tax system disproportionately penalizes high-income 'workhorses' (e.g., doctors, lawyers) who earn from labor. In contrast, the super-rich, who derive wealth from capital gains and have mobility, benefit from loopholes that result in dramatically lower effective tax rates.

Contrary to popular belief, tax and benefit systems in many developed countries have become more progressive since the 1980s. This increased redistribution has successfully counteracted the rise in pre-tax income inequality, meaning post-tax inequality is often no higher than it was in the 1990s.

The problem isn't that college is inherently bad, but that the U.S. system creates a moral hazard. Government-guaranteed, non-dischargeable loans remove any incentive for universities to be competitive on price or deliver value, allowing them to become "parasitic" organizations that saddle students with crippling debt.