Hims & Hers' persistence in selling high-margin compounded GLP-1s, even as shortages ease, is a strategic choice born of necessity. Switching to low-margin branded drugs ($10-15 profit per script) would collapse their business model, making the high-risk strategy a "financial Hail Mary."

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Facing public outrage, Mylan offered a "generic" EpiPen at half price. However, due to convoluted drug pricing economics, this move quelled the controversy while allowing the company to earn nearly the same amount of profit per device. It exposed the illusion of consumer savings in a broken system.

The backend infrastructure built by compound pharmacies to serve telehealth giants like Hims and Ro is now mature. This creates an opportunity for new brands to quickly launch and ship prescription products, effectively using these pharmacies as a platform for regulated health and wellness DTC.

Breakthrough drugs aren't always driven by novel biological targets. Major successes like Humira or GLP-1s often succeeded through a superior modality (a humanized antibody) or a contrarian bet on a market (obesity). This shows that business and technical execution can be more critical than being the first to discover a biological mechanism.

The two pharma giants are competing aggressively in the direct-to-consumer channel. They're cutting prices on their GLP-1 drugs, anticipating that lower costs will drive significantly higher volume and sales in the long run, even if it hurts short-term revenue forecasts.

Research shows that while GLP-1 drug users eat less, they will pay more for high-quality ingredients. This creates a strategic opportunity for restaurants to increase profit margins by offering smaller, premium-priced dishes, tapping into the retail psychology that smaller items can carry a higher proportional markup.

The emergence of low-cost, compounded versions of GLP-1 drugs from telehealth companies like Hims is creating significant pricing pressure on market leaders Novo Nordisk and Eli Lilly. This dynamic has pushed the pharma giants toward direct-to-consumer models with lower prices to compete.

In explosive markets like GLP-1 drugs, significant price drops and margin compression (e.g., from 80% to 60%) don't necessarily harm profits. The sheer volume of new customers can completely offset lower per-unit profitability, leading to far greater overall earnings.

Beyond the initial wave of GLP-1s from Novo and Lilly, the next major competitive front in the obesity market will be monthly injectables. Amgen and Pfizer (via its Metsara acquisition) are poised to lead this race, shifting the focus to dosing convenience and long-term adherence.

To solve the insulin price bubble, Eli Lilly launched its own low-list-price biosimilar. However, insurers and PBMs initially refused to cover it because its low price and small rebate threatened their lucrative business model.

The large gap between insulin's list and net price was driven by Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs). Their business model, which takes a percentage of the rebate, incentivized pharma to raise list prices to offer bigger discounts.

Hims & Hers' Compounded Drug Strategy Is a "Financial Hail Mary" to Preserve Margins | RiffOn