Despite nearly 20 years of significant US investment in training African special forces, jihadism has not been contained. Instead, it has spread from the Sahel to coastal nations, questioning the long-term efficacy of this expensive, hands-on approach.

Despite differing systems—communism in China, nationalism in Russia, theocracy in Iran—modern authoritarian regimes form alliances based on a common enemy. Their unifying principle is a shared dislike and fear of liberal democratic values like the rule of law and individual rights.

Harris advocates for a continuous, covert war against jihadism rather than public, large-scale military invasions. This approach avoids political grandstanding and public backlash, allowing for a persistent policy of preventing jihadist groups from gaining power or weapons without needing to take public credit.

Countering the "blowback" theory, Harris argues that the perception of jihadist success—like the rise of the ISIS caliphate—is what truly inspires new recruits. Therefore, ensuring jihadists are consistently and publicly defeated is the most effective counter-recruitment strategy.

The expanding Middle East conflict is not merely a U.S. versus Iran proxy war. It's reigniting deep-seated, historical violence between different sects of Islam, such as the conflict between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia. This internal dynamic is a critical and often overlooked driver of regional instability.

Unlike hyperbolic online comments, when a government or state-sanctioned group chants "Death to America," it should be interpreted as a literal statement of policy intent. Dismissing it as mere rhetoric is a failure to recognize the direct link between official messaging and future action in authoritarian regimes.

The ongoing war provides the Iranian regime with a pretext for heightened internal security. This allows it to suppress domestic protests and dissent, framing internal control as a necessary measure while managing an external existential threat.

US agencies and linked NGOs actively recruit from marginalized and radicalized populations. These individuals' higher risk tolerance and perceived grievances make them ideal "frontline muscle" for instigating street protests and revolutions, as they are often more willing to get arrested and create disruption.

While autocratic regimes dismantled the Muslim Brotherhood's power, its exiled remnants have failed to regroup. Consumed by infighting and issuing contradictory statements from hubs like London and Turkey, this internal paralysis is as damaging as external oppression, undermining any coherent response to their organization's decline.