A flood of capital into private credit has dramatically increased competition, causing the yield spread over public markets to shrink from 3-4% to less than 1%. This compression raises serious questions about whether investors are still being adequately compensated for illiquidity risk.

Default rates are not uniform. High-yield bonds are low due to a 2020 "cleansing." Leveraged loans show elevated defaults due to higher rates. Private credit defaults are masked but may be as high as 6%, indicated by "bad PIK" amendments, suggesting hidden stress.

The US corporate market is 75% financed by capital markets, while Europe's is ~80% bank-financed. This structural inversion means Europe is undergoing a long-term, multi-decade shift toward institutional lending, creating a sustained tailwind for private credit growth that is far from mature.

Historically, lower-quality credit cycles involved periods of high returns followed by giving all the gains back in a downturn. Post-GFC, the absence of a sustained recession has allowed private credit to outperform high-quality bonds by 7% annually without the typical "give it all back" phase, masking latent risks.

Corporations are increasingly shifting from asset-heavy to capital-light models, often through complex transactions like sale-leasebacks. This strategic trend creates bespoke financing needs that are better served by the flexible solutions of private credit providers than by rigid public markets.

A consistent 2-5% of Europe's public high-yield market restructures annually. The conspicuous absence of a parallel event in private markets, which often finance similar companies, suggests that opacity and mark-to-model valuations may be concealing significant, unacknowledged credit risk in private portfolios.

Official non-accrual rates understate private credit distress. A truer default rate emerges when including covenant defaults and 'bad' Payment-in-Kind interest (PIK) from forced renegotiations. These hidden metrics suggest distress levels are comparable to, if not higher than, public markets.

Credit spreads are becoming an unreliable economic signal. The shift of issuance to private markets reduces the public supply, while the Federal Reserve's 2020 intervention in corporate debt markets permanently altered how investors price default probability.

Public markets favor asset-light models, creating a void for capital-intensive businesses. Private credit fills this gap with an "asset capture" model where they either receive high returns or seize valuable underlying assets upon default, securing a win either way.