The Federal Reserve encouraged banks to buy long-term treasuries while signaling low rates, only to then hike rates at a historic pace. This action decimated the value of those bonds, making the world's 'safest asset' the riskiest and directly triggering bank collapses like Silicon Valley Bank.
Quantitative Easing (QE) forced massive, often uninsured deposits onto bank balance sheets when loan demand was weak. These deposits were highly rate-sensitive. When the Fed began raising rates, this "hot money" quickly fled the system, contributing to the banking volatility seen in March 2023.
Drawing from his time at the US Treasury, Amias Gerety explains that recessions are about slowing growth. A financial crisis is a far more dangerous event where fundamental assumptions collapse because assets previously considered safe are suddenly perceived as worthless, causing a "sudden stop" in the economy.
Former RBI Governor Raghuram Rajan points to a historical pattern preceding every major financial crisis: a U-shape in monetary policy. An extended period of easy money builds up risk, and the subsequent tightening phase triggers the collapse. This framework helps identify periods of heightened systemic vulnerability.
While the market fixates on rate cuts, the Fed's decision to reinvest mortgage-backed security proceeds only into T-bills adds significant duration risk to the market monthly. This is a subtle but impactful form of hawkish policy that counteracts easing narratives.
Despite recent concerns about private credit quality, the most rapid and substantial growth in debt since the GFC has occurred in the government sector. This makes the government bond market, not private credit, the most likely source of a future systemic crisis, especially in a rising rate environment.
The bond market will become volatile not when rates hit a certain number, but when the market perceives the Fed's cutting cycle has ended and the next move could be a hike. This "legitimate pause" will cause a rapid, painful steepening of the yield curve.
While the 2008 crisis centered on commercial banks and mortgages, today's problem is rooted in the central banks themselves. The Fed's policies actively devalued US treasuries—the bedrock of the system—making this a more fundamental central banking and currency crisis, not just a banking one.
Jeff Gundlach notes a significant market anomaly: long-term interest rates have risen substantially since the Fed began its recent cutting cycle. Historically, Fed cuts have always led to lower long-term rates. This break in precedent suggests a fundamental regime change in the bond market.
While low rates make borrowing to invest (leverage) seem seductive, it's exceptionally dangerous in an economy driven by debt management. Abrupt policy shifts can cause sudden volatility and dry up liquidity overnight, triggering margin calls and forcing sales at the worst possible times. Wealth is transferred from the over-leveraged to the liquid during these resets.
For 40 years, falling rates pushed 'safe' bond funds into increasingly risky assets to chase yield. With rates now rising, these mis-categorized portfolios are the most vulnerable part of the financial system. A crisis in credit or sovereign debt is more probable than a stock-market-led crash.