Destroying Iran's conventional military without toppling the regime could create a cornered, vengeful state. Lacking other options and led by a leader whose father was just killed, it might turn to asymmetric warfare like terrorism to retaliate for its humiliation and losses.

Regardless of intent, military actions like bombings create personal tragedies that radicalize individuals. This blowback is an unavoidable consequence of war, leading to revenge attacks and perpetuating the conflict, a factor often underestimated in strategic planning.

Violent acts are not random; they often represent the logical conclusion within a person's specific frame of reference. If an ideology convinces someone they are fighting a Hitler-like evil, then assassination becomes a moral duty, not a crime. The danger lies in these justifying belief systems.

Countering the "blowback" theory, Harris argues that the perception of jihadist success—like the rise of the ISIS caliphate—is what truly inspires new recruits. Therefore, ensuring jihadists are consistently and publicly defeated is the most effective counter-recruitment strategy.

Viewing the conflict as two rational sides in a misunderstanding is flawed. Both sides see the other as an existential threat and are willing to use extreme violence to achieve their goals. This reframes the narrative from a political dispute to a primal, violent tribal conflict where both sides see themselves as righteous.

In the aftermath of political violence, the targeted group often mirrors the very dehumanizing tactics they condemn. While correctly identifying an attacker's ideology, they risk escalating the conflict by applying labels like 'evil' to the entire opposing side, thus perpetuating the cycle of radicalization that fuels violence.

US agencies and linked NGOs actively recruit from marginalized and radicalized populations. These individuals' higher risk tolerance and perceived grievances make them ideal "frontline muscle" for instigating street protests and revolutions, as they are often more willing to get arrested and create disruption.

The Bondi Beach attack exemplifies a trend where individuals, while not part of a local cell, are inspired and sometimes trained by global terror groups like ISIS. This model of indirect incitement makes such attacks difficult for security services to predict or prevent, posing a significant global threat.

Despite widespread internal protests and instability, history shows that an external attack is one of the few things that can unify the Iranian population. A potential Israeli strike, meant to weaken the regime, could backfire by creating a 'rally 'round the flag' effect that shores up support for the Ayatollah.