The significant time until Argentina's October elections creates a dangerous feedback loop. The market's anticipation of a weaker currency post-election incentivizes investors to sell pesos now. This pressure forces authorities into reactive controls, which reinforces the negative sentiment they are trying to combat.
Emerging market central banks' hawkish commentary while cutting rates reinforces market stability. This low volatility, in turn, gives them confidence to continue the cutting cycle. This feedback loop can make low-volatility periods surprisingly persistent, as the actions and outcomes mutually reinforce each other.
The U.S. is more likely to follow Argentina's path: currency inflation, populist policies funded by deficit spending, and an eventual economic collapse leading to a century of stagnation. This is a more insidious threat than a dramatic revolution.
Unprecedented US financial support, likened to Draghi's "whatever it takes," has successfully created a circuit breaker for Argentina's negative market feedback loop. However, this support only addresses financial symptoms (FX and credit risk) and cannot solve the underlying political uncertainty about the government's ability to implement reforms.
Given the unreliability of polling, markets will wait for tangible results before reacting. The composition of congress will be the first concrete signal, with a divided or right-leaning legislature seen as a positive check on executive power. This could trigger currency rallies well before the final presidential outcome is known.
With the exception of Brazil's BRL, investor positioning in Latam currencies is not over-extended. This means the magnitude of currency moves should be similar in either a government continuity or transition scenario, creating a balanced risk profile rather than a one-sided vulnerability to a specific political outcome.
Despite political polarization, FX volatility is expected to be less than half of the 20% depreciation seen in the last cycle. This is due to a less tense social fabric, more moderate economic agendas, and strong institutions that have proven effective at limiting executive power and radical reforms.
While overall EM credit spreads are near post-GFC tights, making value scarce, Argentina stands out. Following positive legislative election results, its sovereign debt has rallied significantly but remains wide compared to its own history and peer countries, suggesting substantial room for further performance in an otherwise expensive market.
When countries run large, structural government deficits, their policy options become limited. Historically, this state of 'fiscal dominance' leads to the implementation of capital controls and other financial frictions to prevent capital flight and manage the currency, increasing risks for investors.
Unlike the 2021-22 cycle which coincided with post-COVID overheating, Latam economies now boast a more resilient backdrop with lower current account deficits, positive real policy rates, and moderated inflation. This strength, coupled with appealing valuations, provides a substantial cushion against political volatility for local rates markets.
Unlike the US, emerging markets are constrained by financial markets. If they let their fiscal balance deteriorate, markets punish their currency, triggering a vicious cycle of inflation and higher interest rates. This threat serves as a natural check on government spending, enforcing a level of fiscal responsibility.