Get your free personalized podcast brief

We scan new podcasts and send you the top 5 insights daily.

Many economists who incorrectly predicted a recession in 2022-2023 now appear 'gun shy.' This recency bias may be causing them to avoid making a definitive recession call, even as negative economic indicators accumulate, leading to a reluctance to stick their necks out.

Related Insights

The ratio of leading-to-coincident economic indicators is at historic lows seen only in deep recessions (1982, 2009). However, this may be skewed by the leading indicators' reliance on extremely negative consumer sentiment surveys. This divergence suggests we might be at the bottom of a cycle, not the beginning of a downturn.

The sharp drop in the fiscal impulse represents a direct, dollar-for-dollar hit to nominal GDP that has already occurred. This indicates a recession is underway, not forthcoming. The National Bureau of Economic Analysis (NBER) will likely backdate the start of this recession to the third quarter of 2025.

Analysts, economists, and thought leaders have a professional incentive to make pessimistic, catastrophic predictions. Optimistic forecasts of gradual improvement are less interesting and don't command high speaking fees or media attention, creating a systemic bias towards negativity in public discourse.

A historically reliable recession predictor, the Conference Board's Composite Leading Indicator, has been declining for years and experienced a peak-to-trough drop that has always preceded a recession. Its failure to correctly signal one in the 2022-2023 period shows how even trusted indicators can be fallible in the current economy.

The podcast's economists assess the probability of a recession in the next year at 40-45%, significantly higher than the consensus view of 25-30%. This heightened risk is based on deteriorating labor market trends and is corroborated by Moody's own machine learning models.

When predicting major economic shifts like a bond market crisis or an AI stock correction, being wrong in a specific year doesn't invalidate the thesis. The underlying pressures may still exist, with the predicted event simply postponed. This reframes forecast misses as primarily errors in timing rather than analysis.

To formally change its baseline forecast to a recession, the firm employs a high-conviction rule of thumb. The internal probability must exceed two-thirds, ensuring there is a high degree of confidence and only a one-third chance of being wrong before making such a significant shift in outlook.

Despite weak underlying economic data, the probability of a recession is not over 50% due to anticipated policy stimulus. This includes Fed rate cuts, major tax cuts, and deregulation, which are expected to provide significant, albeit temporary, economic support.

The Sahm Rule provides a clear signal that a recession has begun: when the three-month moving average unemployment rate rises by more than 0.5 percentage points above its low from the previous year. This metric is useful for cutting through noise and identifying when a slowly weakening job market has definitively tipped into a downturn.

An analysis modeling the NBER's recession dating methodology at the state level reveals a fractured economic landscape. As of September, states representing one-third of the nation's GDP were in or near recessionary conditions. This contrasts with the strong national headline numbers and highlights significant underlying weakness in specific regions.

Economists Exhibit Recency Bias, Hesitating to Call a Recession After Failed 2022 Predictions | RiffOn