Rajan suggests that a central bank's reluctance to aggressively fight inflation may stem from a fear of being blamed for a potential recession. In a politically charged environment, the institutional risk of becoming the 'fall guy' can subtly influence policy, leading to a more dovish stance than economic data alone would suggest.

The Fed's recent rate cuts, despite strong economic indicators, are seen as a capitulation to political pressure. This suggests the central bank is now functioning as a "political utility" to manage government debt, marking a victory for political influence over its traditional independence.

Increasing political influence, including presidential pressure and politically-aligned board appointments, is compromising the Federal Reserve's independence. This suggests future monetary policy may be more dovish than economic data warrants, as the Fed is pushed to prioritize short-term growth ahead of elections.

The primary economic risk for the next year is not recession but overheating. A dovish shift at the Federal Reserve, potentially from a new Trump appointee, combined with loose fiscal policy and tariffs, could accelerate inflation to 4%, dislodge expectations, and spike long-term yields.

Rajan argues that a central bank's independence is not guaranteed by its structure but by the political consensus supporting it. When political polarization increases, institutions like the Fed become vulnerable to pressure, as their supposed autonomy is only as strong as the political will to uphold it.

While tariffs were a dominant market concern previously, they have fallen in priority for investors. The primary focus has shifted to more systemic risks, including the potential for fiscal dominance over the Federal Reserve and the long-term trend of "de-dollarization" among global institutions.

Alan Blinder identifies a pending Supreme Court case on the President's power to remove a Fed governor as a potential market catalyst. An adverse ruling would set a precedent allowing political removal of governors, which could abruptly awaken "bond vigilantes" to the reality of a compromised central bank.

Alan Blinder notes that politicians, driven by electoral cycles, lack the will to use fiscal tools (like tax hikes or spending cuts) to cool an overheating economy. The last instance was in 1968 under President Johnson, underscoring why an independent central bank is the only reliable institutional defense against inflation.

The Federal Reserve is pressured to cut rates not just for economic stability, but to protect its own independence. Failing to act pre-emptively could lead to a recession, for which the Fed would be blamed. This would invite intense political pressure and calls for executive oversight, making rate cuts a defensive institutional maneuver.