The 5% default rate in private credit, compared to 3% in syndicated loans, is a function of its target market: smaller companies. Just as the Russell 2000 is more volatile than the Dow Jones, smaller businesses are inherently riskier. Applying leverage to a more volatile asset pool naturally results in more defaults.

A telecom financing company defrauded lenders including BlackRock's HPS of over $500 million by fabricating receivables from major carriers like T-Mobile. The entire scheme, involving forged contracts and spoofed emails, would have been exposed by a single phone call to verify the collateral, highlighting severe due diligence failures in the booming private credit market.

Recent "canary in the coal mine" cases like First Brands, often blamed on private markets, were not PE-owned and were primarily financed in liquid markets. In fact, it was private credit firms pushing for deeper diligence that exposed the issues, strengthening the argument that private credit offers a safer way to access the asset class.

Despite headlines blaming private credit for failures like First Brands, the vast majority (over 95%) of the exposure lies with banks and in the liquid credit markets. This narrative overlooks the structural advantages and deeper diligence inherent in private deals.

Contrary to theories that recent blow-ups like Tricolor indicate more fraud is coming, the real issue is broad economic stress. Using Warren Buffett's "tide goes out" analogy, higher rates and persistent inflation are exposing fundamental weaknesses and squeezing consumers across large, non-AI sectors of the economy.

Unlike syndicated loans where non-payment is a clear default, private credit has a "third state" where lenders accept PIK interest on underperforming loans. When this "bad PIK" is correctly categorized as a default, the sector's true default rate is significantly higher, around 5% versus 3% for syndicated loans.

Official non-accrual rates understate private credit distress. A truer default rate emerges when including covenant defaults and 'bad' Payment-in-Kind interest (PIK) from forced renegotiations. These hidden metrics suggest distress levels are comparable to, if not higher than, public markets.

Auto parts company FBG funded its acquisition spree with a sophisticated fraud using "invoice factoring," a corporate version of a payday loan. By selling the same tranche of invoices to multiple private creditors, it illegitimately raised funds, leading to a collapse with $2.3 billion unaccounted for.

Lenders allow struggling borrowers to skip cash interest payments by adding the amount to the loan's principal balance. This practice, called 'Payment in Kind' (PIK), hides defaults, artificially inflates asset values, and creates a deceptively low official default rate, masking escalating risk within the system.