The U.S. government approaches economic foreign policy in a piecemeal fashion, with different factions advocating for trade, investment controls, or supply chain resilience separately. This lack of an integrated national economic security strategy leads to internal competition for resources and inconsistent policy application.

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Politicians predictably declare initiatives for domestic production of critical goods like munitions or rare earths when dependencies are exposed. However, these declarations rarely translate into effective action, suggesting we must learn to manage economic entanglement as a form of mutual deterrence rather than wish it away.

The term "economic security" has evolved. FDR used it to mean a social safety net. The Clinton administration defined it as safe global free trade. Today, it's viewed through a national security lens, treating economic and technological strength as a core component of national power, similar to military or diplomacy.

The current trade friction is part of a larger, long-term bipartisan U.S. strategy of "competitive confrontation." This involves not just tariffs but also significant domestic investment, like the CHIPS Act, to build resilient supply chains and reduce reliance on China for critical industries, a trend expected to persist across administrations.

A country's ability to rely on allies for strategic production is undermined by conflicting internal policies. For example, the U.S. seeking shipbuilding cooperation from South Korea while its immigration agents raid a Korean-owned factory sends mixed signals and erodes trust.

Key departments like Commerce have conflicting mandates. The Commerce Secretary's primary goal is to promote U.S. business abroad, which structurally disincentivizes them from implementing tough export controls that could harm those same businesses, thus undermining national security objectives.

The U.S.-China Commission proposes consolidating disparate economic tools like export controls into a single entity. This would prevent critical decisions from languishing at mid-levels within conflicted departments and create a single forcing function for action, reducing the need for constant NSC intervention.

Supply chain vulnerability isn't just about individual parts. The real test is whether a complex defense system, like a directed energy weapon, can be manufactured *entirely* from components sourced within the U.S. or from unshakeable allies. Currently, this is not possible, representing a critical security gap.

A major obstacle to securing U.S. supply chains is a deliberate lack of data. The government has avoided mandating data collection on critical dependencies, like pharmaceutical ingredients from China, out of deference to industry. This prevents policymakers from even understanding the extent of their vulnerabilities.

The U.S. reactively chases news headlines (like rare earths) without a rigorous framework to identify its most critical dependencies. Policymakers have not prioritized whether to secure wartime supply chains or mitigate China's leverage over consumer goods that could spark domestic political crises.

In trying to compete, the U.S. is mirroring China's protectionism and industrial policy. This is a strategic error, as the U.S. political system lacks the ability to centrally direct resources and execute long-term industrial strategy as effectively as China's state-controlled economy.