Rajan suggests that a central bank's reluctance to aggressively fight inflation may stem from a fear of being blamed for a potential recession. In a politically charged environment, the institutional risk of becoming the 'fall guy' can subtly influence policy, leading to a more dovish stance than economic data alone would suggest.

The Fed's recent rate cuts, despite strong economic indicators, are seen as a capitulation to political pressure. This suggests the central bank is now functioning as a "political utility" to manage government debt, marking a victory for political influence over its traditional independence.

Market stability is an evolutionary process where each crisis acts as a learning event. The 2008 crash taught policymakers how to respond with tools like credit facilities, enabling a much faster, more effective response to the COVID-19 shock. Crises are not just failures but necessary reps that improve systemic resilience.

Rajan argues that a central bank's independence is not guaranteed by its structure but by the political consensus supporting it. When political polarization increases, institutions like the Fed become vulnerable to pressure, as their supposed autonomy is only as strong as the political will to uphold it.

The 1920s bubble was uniquely driven by the new concept of retail leverage. Financial institutions transported the nascent idea of buying cars on credit to the stock market, allowing individuals to buy stocks with as little as 10% down, creating unprecedented and fragile speculation.

Core components of today's financial landscape, including FDIC insurance, Social Security, and even the 30-year mortgage, were not products of gradual evolution. They were specific policies created rapidly out of the financial ashes of the Great Depression, demonstrating how systemic shocks can accelerate fundamental structural reforms.

Contrary to popular belief, the 1929 crash wasn't an instantaneous event. It took a full year for public confidence to erode and for the new reality to set in. This illustrates that markets can absorb financial shocks, but they cannot withstand a sustained, spiraling loss of confidence.

Instead of raising interest rates, the Fed in 1929 relied on "moral suasion"—sending letters asking banks to stop lending to speculators. This vague, unenforceable policy was largely ignored by bankers who questioned the definition of a 'speculator,' proving ineffective at cooling the market.

Alan Blinder notes that politicians, driven by electoral cycles, lack the will to use fiscal tools (like tax hikes or spending cuts) to cool an overheating economy. The last instance was in 1968 under President Johnson, underscoring why an independent central bank is the only reliable institutional defense against inflation.