Rajan suggests that a central bank's reluctance to aggressively fight inflation may stem from a fear of being blamed for a potential recession. In a politically charged environment, the institutional risk of becoming the 'fall guy' can subtly influence policy, leading to a more dovish stance than economic data alone would suggest.

Recent inflation was primarily driven by fiscal spending, not the bank-lending credit booms of the 1970s. The Fed’s main tool—raising interest rates—is designed to curb bank lending. This creates a mismatch where the Fed is slowing the private sector to counteract a problem created by the public sector.

The most imprudent lending decisions occur during economic booms. Widespread optimism, complacency, and fear of missing out cause investors to lower their standards and overlook risks, sowing the seeds for future failures that are only revealed in a downturn.

The policy restricted developer borrowing to curb speculation but failed to address the core drivers: households' need for a savings vehicle and local governments' dependency on land sales for revenue. By attacking the intermediary, the policy caused a crisis without solving the fundamental problem.

In 1929, the stock exchange ticker fell hours behind real-time trading. This information vacuum created immense uncertainty, forcing investors to physically crowd Wall Street for updates. This chaos, driven by a lack of data, contrasts sharply with today's high-speed, social-media-fueled market reactions.

The 1920s bubble was uniquely driven by the new concept of retail leverage. Financial institutions transported the nascent idea of buying cars on credit to the stock market, allowing individuals to buy stocks with as little as 10% down, creating unprecedented and fragile speculation.

The act of a small committee deciding the "correct" cost of money is analogous to communist planners setting prices for consumer goods. This approach assumes an impossible level of knowledge and control over a complex economy, a model that has consistently failed throughout history.

When the prevailing narrative, supported by Fed actions, is that the economy will 'run hot,' it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Consumers and institutions alter their behavior by borrowing more and buying hard assets, which in turn fuels actual inflation.

Contrary to popular belief, the 1929 crash wasn't an instantaneous event. It took a full year for public confidence to erode and for the new reality to set in. This illustrates that markets can absorb financial shocks, but they cannot withstand a sustained, spiraling loss of confidence.