While China supports institutions like the UN, its primary strategy for global influence is creating new, economically-focused organizations like the BRICS Bank and regional summits (e.g., China-Africa). This approach builds alternative power centers and economic interdependence with the Global South, supplementing rather than directly challenging the post-war Western order.
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China's economic ascent began when Deng Xiaoping invited American experts to teach them about capitalism. This strategy, combined with becoming the world's manufacturing hub, allowed them to learn the system, grow strong quietly, and eventually become a dominant global power.
While a unipolar world led by one's own country is advantageous, a multipolar world with competing powers like the U.S. and China creates a dynamic tension. This competition may force more compromised global decisions, potentially leading to a more balanced, albeit more tense, international system than one dominated by a single unchallenged power.
Unlike the Soviet Union's missionary zeal to spread communism, China does not want other nations to become Chinese. Its worldview is centered on being the 'Middle Kingdom'—the sun which others orbit. It desires respect and a preeminent position, not to export its political system.
As America's global dominance wanes, power is bifurcating into two distinct successor empires. China is winning the physical world of manufacturing and military hardware. Simultaneously, the internet is winning the digital world of media (AI, social) and money (crypto, smart contracts). This succession has already occurred but has not been fully priced in by global markets.
China embraces economic globalization, crediting it for lifting 800 million from poverty. However, it explicitly rejects the "militarized globalization" represented by security pacts like AUKUS or NATO expansion. This differentiates its approach from the Western model, which often intertwines economic integration with shared security and political values.
From a Chinese perspective, its vast manufacturing capacity, supported by world-class infrastructure, is a global utility. The concept of "Made in China" is reframed as "Made for the World." This view suggests the U.S. should focus on its own strengths like innovation ("zero to one") instead of viewing China's manufacturing prowess ("one to 100") as a national security threat.
Contrary to common perception, China holds the stronger hand in its relationship with the U.S. As the world's creditor and primary producer, China can sell its goods to billions of other global consumers. The U.S., as a debtor and consumer nation, is far more dependent on China than the other way around.
Beyond raw materials, China's national ambition is to achieve near-total self-sufficiency. The prevailing mood is that there is "nothing for which it wants to rely on foreigners a single day longer than it has to." This philosophy of aggressive import substitution signals a fundamental break with the logic of reciprocal global trade.
A multinational peacekeeping force from BRICS countries (China, India, Brazil, etc.) could be more effective in conflicts like the Russia-Ukraine war. The rationale is that these nations are seen as more neutral than NATO and hold significant economic leverage (e.g., as major buyers of Russian energy), making them a credible guarantee against further aggression.
From 2001 onwards, while the U.S. was militarily and economically distracted by the War on Terror, China executed a long-term strategy. It focused on acquiring Western technology and building indigenous capabilities in AI, telecom, and robotics, effectively creating a rival global economic system.
