A key tension in studying consciousness is identified. Cognitive science often starts atomistically, asking how disparate sensory inputs (color, shape) are "bound" together. This contrasts with William James's phenomenological claim that experience is *already* holistic, and that breaking it into components is an artificial, post-hoc analysis.

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This theory posits that our lives don't *create* subjective experiences (qualia). Instead, our lives are the emergent result of a fundamental consciousness cycling through a sequence of possible qualia, dictated by probabilistic, Markovian rules.

In a reality where spacetime is not fundamental, physical objects like neurons are merely "rendered" upon observation. Therefore, neurons cannot be the fundamental creator of consciousness because they don't exist independently until an observer interacts with them.

The leading theory of consciousness, Global Workspace Theory, posits a central "stage" where different siloed information processors converge. Today's AI models generally lack this specific architecture, making them unlikely to be conscious under this prominent scientific framework.

Though not empirical in a modern sense, William James's introspective method is defended as valid psychological inquiry. Its power lies in articulating subjective experiences—like the feeling of a forgotten name—in a way that illuminates the reader's own inner life, similar to how a visual illusion works on everyone.

James's concept of consciousness's "fringe" is shown via the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon. The inability to recall a name isn't a void; it's an "empty" thought with a specific shape. We know immediately if a suggested name is wrong, proving that even a mental blank has a distinct, qualitative character.

The debate over AI consciousness isn't just because models mimic human conversation. Researchers are uncertain because the way LLMs process information is structurally similar enough to the human brain that it raises plausible scientific questions about shared properties like subjective experience.

The simulation of space-time and its physical laws are not arbitrary; they are essential constraints. These rules create the context required for consciousness to explore its possibilities and for subjective experiences (qualia) to become meaningful. Without limitations, there is no context for feeling.

The right hemisphere of the brain doesn't define a separate "you." It experiences the world as a unified whole, integrating all sensory input into one big picture. This is the neurological basis for "flow states" or feelings of transcendence, where the boundary between self and the world dissolves.

To move from philosophy to science, abstract theories about consciousness must make concrete, falsifiable predictions about the physical world. Hoffman's work attempts this by proposing precise mathematical links between conscious agent dynamics and observable particle properties like mass and spin.

Hoffman's model proposes that consciousness is not a product of the physical brain within space-time. Instead, consciousness is the fundamental building block of all existence, and space-time itself is an emergent phenomenon—a "headset" or user interface—that is created by and within consciousness.

Cognitive Science's 'Binding Problem' Clashes with James's Holism of Subjective Experience | RiffOn