When David Swenson published the "Yale Model," many institutions tried to copy it without possessing Yale's resources, network, or manager selection expertise. This led many to chase private equity and hedge funds ill-equipped, resulting in them backing lower-quartile managers and achieving poor results.

The private markets industry is bifurcating. General Partners (GPs) must either scale massively with broad distribution to sell multiple products, or focus on a highly differentiated, unique strategy. The middle ground—being a mid-sized, undifferentiated firm—is becoming the most difficult position to defend.

Capital has become commoditized with thousands of PE firms competing. The old model of buying low and selling high with minor tweaks no longer works. True value creation has shifted to hands-on operational improvements that drive long-term growth, a skill many investors lack.

The primary growth drivers for private equity—sovereign wealth and private wealth channels—prefer concentrating capital in large, brand-name firms. This capital shift starves middle-market players of new funds, leading to a likely industry contraction where many may have unknowingly raised their last fund.

While David Swenson's Yale model is famous, investors can learn from older, less-publicized endowment strategies. This highlights the need to adapt core investment principles to current markets rather than rigidly copying a single, popular historical approach.

The inability to return capital to LPs constrains new fundraising, creating an environment that cannot support the thousands of PE funds operating today. This will trigger a shakeout of weaker GPs, while the top 10 funds, already capturing 36% of capital, further consolidate their dominance.

In a sign of extreme risk aversion and consolidation, the number of first-time funds raising capital has "cratered." LPs are concentrating their commitments with established mega-funds, creating an almost impossible environment for new managers to enter the market, which stifles industry growth and innovation.

The once-revolutionary strategy of heavy allocation to private assets, pioneered by Yale's David Swenson, has been so widely copied that it has lost its edge. Gurley argues this 'mimic effect' has led most endowments to be over-invested in illiquid private equity and venture funds with potentially inflated, stale valuations.

Institutional allocators are currently over-allocated to illiquid private assets due to the denominator effect. When distributions from these funds finally resume, the initial wave of capital will be used to rebalance portfolios back toward public markets, not immediately recycled into new private equity commitments, a trend private GPs may not see coming.