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Gigs’ first customer was a kids’ smartwatch company with 30–40% Amazon returns caused by wrong SIM cards. Herman says embedding SIMs at the factory and activating subscriptions in the parental app removed returns and created recurring revenue. That forgiving niche let Gigs harden its platform before taking on smartphone subscriptions.
Carriers initially ignored Gigs, so Herman’s team plugged into an aggregator that was behind on its network commitments. The economics were terrible, but it enabled the first smartwatch product. When that aggregator’s growth jumped, the network noticed and that opened the door to Gigs’ first carrier deal, with AT&T.
Companies like Whoop and Eight Sleep successfully use subscriptions not because their hardware requires constant upgrades, but because recurring revenue is a superior business model. This creates a vulnerability: if users can bypass the software lock-in, the model collapses without significant hardware improvements.
When transitioning hardware to a subscription, avoid a freemium model. Instead, make the subscription core to the experience. If a user stops paying, the product should collapse to minimal functionality. This stark value difference prompts quick renewals.
Herman says Gigs intentionally built the API first, then spent heavily on distribution by onboarding large consumer and enterprise platforms. Those integrations put more than a billion people behind Gigs’ customers, even without a billion active lines. More distribution creates more network volume, which improves pricing and supports more carrier integrations.
Most SaaS startups begin with SMBs for faster sales cycles. Nexla did the opposite, targeting complex enterprise problems from day one. This forced them to build a deeply capable platform that could later be simplified for smaller customers, rather than trying to scale up an SMB solution.
Herman says Gigs reached its first fit with kids’ smartwatches, then fintechs, then enterprise software. He argues founders usually think they have product-market fit too early; real fit requires repeatable sales to the same ICP, launches, and retention over and over. He calls it vertical market fit, not company-wide fit.
Despite selling over 200,000 alarm clocks, the founder realized that success with a single, one-time-purchase product is insufficient for long-term sustainability. This led to a strategic shift towards building a digital app with recurring revenue, a crucial lesson for any DTC brand focused on a hero product.
To compete with giants like Amazon, Spangle didn't build a full platform. They found a niche "connector" problem: the loss of context between an Instagram ad and the e-commerce site. This focused wedge delivered immediate value that incumbents had overlooked, creating a crucial entry point.
Instead of starting with a scalable platform, Decagon built bespoke, perfect solutions for its first few enterprise customers. This validated their ability to solve the core problem deeply. Only after proving this value did they abstract the common patterns into a platform.
Instead of building a product from scratch, Wash Dry Fold POS began by reselling and bundling existing software and hardware. This allowed them to learn the market, understand customer needs, and build a profitable business before writing a single line of their own code.