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Carriers initially ignored Gigs, so Herman’s team plugged into an aggregator that was behind on its network commitments. The economics were terrible, but it enabled the first smartwatch product. When that aggregator’s growth jumped, the network noticed and that opened the door to Gigs’ first carrier deal, with AT&T.
Early on, Gigs told investors it was building “Stripe for phone plans.” Herman says that parallel helped people outside telecom understand the mechanics and opportunity, and early Stripe employees joined because it reminded them of Stripe’s early days. The analogy carried the story until Gigs could tell its own more detailed vision.
Gigs hires people who previously worked at its target customers, including many ex-Stripe employees. Herman says those hires can reach 30–50% of the target list with people who are known and trusted, so calls get taken and listened to. It is a network advantage in competitive enterprise deals.
Herman says Gigs intentionally built the API first, then spent heavily on distribution by onboarding large consumer and enterprise platforms. Those integrations put more than a billion people behind Gigs’ customers, even without a billion active lines. More distribution creates more network volume, which improves pricing and supports more carrier integrations.
Herman says landing multi-billion-dollar customers requires convincing several layers: founders or C-level, operating teams, and developers. Gigs assigns product engineers to talk to product engineers, sales VPs to sales VPs, and the founder to the founder. That 360-degree coverage at different levels is why Herman says Gigs wins about 90% of its deals.
Herman says Gigs reached its first fit with kids’ smartwatches, then fintechs, then enterprise software. He argues founders usually think they have product-market fit too early; real fit requires repeatable sales to the same ICP, launches, and retention over and over. He calls it vertical market fit, not company-wide fit.
To get rule changes from giants like Visa and MasterCard, Square didn't fight them. Instead, they showed how their technology would bring millions of new, smaller merchants onto the credit card network—a market the incumbents' existing system was too expensive and complex to reach.
Samsara capitalized on the ELD mandate, a government regulation that forced the entire trucking industry to buy electronic logging devices. This tailwind created instant, industry-wide budget for their product, allowing them to rapidly gain market share against incumbents like AT&T and Verizon.
Herman argues banks already have KYC, payment methods, and wallet-like consumer habits, so they can activate phone subscriptions simply. Carriers dislike financing phones, while banks want another recurring loan and touchpoint. That lets banks bundle a phone and plan, then add perks like Cash App Green or Revolut points, making them structurally better telecom sellers.
Gigs’ first customer was a kids’ smartwatch company with 30–40% Amazon returns caused by wrong SIM cards. Herman says embedding SIMs at the factory and activating subscriptions in the parental app removed returns and created recurring revenue. That forgiving niche let Gigs harden its platform before taking on smartphone subscriptions.
StatusGator became a marketplace by first building a valuable single-sided tool. Data from free users searching for outages (one side) became the valuable product—early warnings—sold to paying enterprise customers (the other side), validating the model before fully committing.