In credit markets, where transaction costs can reach 70-80 basis points for high-yield bonds, a systematic strategy's success hinges equally on its trading efficiency as on its return forecasts. A good model is useless if its alpha is consumed by trading costs.

As private credit funds absorb riskier, smaller deals, the public high-yield market is left with larger, more stable companies. This migration has improved the overall quality and lowered default rates for public high-yield bonds, creating a performance divergence.

Passive, cap-weighted fixed income funds behave like momentum traders, buying more of a bond as its price rises. This is a flawed strategy for fixed income because many bonds are callable, meaning their upside is capped and rising prices increase call risk. Active management can exploit this inefficiency.

The CCC-rated segment of the high-yield market should not be treated as a simple down-in-quality allocation. Instead, it's a "stock picker's" environment where opportunities are found in specific, idiosyncratic situations with high conviction, such as a turnaround story or a mispriced part of a company's capital structure.

Counterintuitively, high-yield corporate bonds are expected to perform better than investment-grade credit. They do not face the same supply headwind from AI-related debt issuance, and their fundamentals are supported by credit team forecasts of declining default rates over the next 12 months.

In the post-zero-interest-rate era, the “everything rally” driven by liquidity is over. Higher base rates mean companies must demonstrate fundamental strength, not just ride a market wave. This environment rewards active managers who can perform deep credit selection, as weaker credits no longer outperform by default.

In bond investing, where upside is capped at a promised return, superior performance comes from what you exclude, not what you buy. The primary task is to eliminate the bonds that will default. Once those are removed, all the remaining performing bonds deliver a similar, contractually-fixed return.

Goodwin argues against the passive "index-hugging" approach to credit focused on coupon payments and agency ratings. Diameter's edge comes from approaching credit like an equity long-short fund, constantly analyzing what macro and sector trends will change security prices over the next 3 to 24 months to generate total return.

Judging the credit market by its overall index spread is misleading. The significant gap between the tightest and widest spreads (high dispersion) reveals that the market is rewarding quality and punishing uncertainty. This makes individual credit selection far more important than a top-down market view.