The yield premium for private credit has shrunk, meaning investors are no longer adequately compensated for the additional illiquidity, concentration, and credit risk they assume. Publicly traded high-yield bonds and bank loans now offer comparable returns with better diversification and liquidity, questioning the rationale for allocating to private credit.

A strategic divergence exists in EM corporate credit. Mandate-bound real money funds feel compelled to stay invested due to a lack of near-term negative catalysts, while more flexible hedge funds are actively taking short positions, betting that historically tight spreads will inevitably widen over the next 6-12 months.

Post-crisis stigma has faded, making Collateralized Loan Obligation (CLO) tranches a top relative value pick in credit markets. The structure allows investors to precisely select risk exposure, from safe AAA tranches with attractive spreads to high-return equity positions, outperforming other credit assets.

The credit market appears healthy based on tight average spreads, but this is misleading. A strong top 90% of the market pulls the average down, while the bottom 10% faces severe distress, with loans "dropping like a stone." The weight of prolonged high borrowing costs is creating a clear divide between healthy and struggling companies.

While default risk exists, the more pressing problem for credit investors is a severe supply-demand imbalance. A shortage of new M&A and corporate issuance, combined with massive sideline capital (e.g., $8T in money markets), keeps spreads historically tight and makes finding attractive opportunities the main challenge.

The CCC-rated segment of the high-yield market should not be treated as a simple down-in-quality allocation. Instead, it's a "stock picker's" environment where opportunities are found in specific, idiosyncratic situations with high conviction, such as a turnaround story or a mispriced part of a company's capital structure.

In the post-zero-interest-rate era, the “everything rally” driven by liquidity is over. Higher base rates mean companies must demonstrate fundamental strength, not just ride a market wave. This environment rewards active managers who can perform deep credit selection, as weaker credits no longer outperform by default.

Instead of an imminent collapse, the credit market is likely poised for a final surge in risk-taking. A combination of AI enthusiasm, Fed easing, and fiscal spending will probably drive markets higher and fuel more corporate debt issuance. This growth in leverage will sow the seeds for the eventual downturn.

In a market where spreads are tight and technicals prevent sustained sell-offs, making large directional bets is a poor strategy. The best approach is to stay close to benchmarks in terms of overall risk and allocate the risk budget to identifying specific winners and losers through deep, fundamental credit analysis.