The AI bubble may be less about the technology's potential and more about financial structuring. Companies like CoreWeave exist partly to absorb the low-margin, high-capex business of running GPUs. This protects the high-margin profiles of hyperscalers like Microsoft, preventing their stock from being dragged down by less attractive data center economics.
Instead of bearing the full cost and risk of building new AI data centers, large cloud providers like Microsoft use CoreWeave for 'overflow' compute. This allows them to meet surges in customer demand without committing capital to assets that depreciate quickly and may become competitors' infrastructure in the long run.
A year ago, stable giants like Microsoft and Amazon absorbed the risk of the AI compute build-out. Now, they've stepped back, and smaller players like Oracle and CoreWeave, along with chipmakers financing their own sales, have taken on that risk. This shift to less stable, more circular financing models reveals the bubble's underlying fragility.
Current AI investment patterns mirror the "round-tripping" seen in the late '90s tech bubble. For example, NVIDIA invests billions in a startup like OpenAI, which then uses that capital to purchase NVIDIA chips. This creates an illusion of demand and inflated valuations, masking the lack of real, external customer revenue.
The current AI spending frenzy uniquely merges elements from all major historical bubbles—real estate (data centers), technology, loose credit, and a government backstop—making a soft landing improbable. This convergence of risk factors is unprecedented.
The AI ecosystem appears to have circular cash flows. For example, Microsoft invests billions in OpenAI, which then uses that money to pay Microsoft for compute services. This creates revenue for Microsoft while funding OpenAI, but it raises investor concerns about how much organic, external demand truly exists for these costly services.
The key signal for an AI bubble isn't just stock market commentary. It's the transition of data center buildouts from being funded by free cash flow to being funded by debt, particularly from private credit firms. This massive, less-visible market is the real stress test for AI's financial stability.
Companies like NVIDIA invest billions in AI startups (e.g., OpenAI) with the understanding the money will be spent on their chips. This "round tripping" creates massive, artificial market cap growth but is incredibly fragile and reminiscent of the dot-com bubble's accounting tricks.
The AI infrastructure boom is a potential house of cards. A single dollar of end-user revenue paid to a company like OpenAI can become $8 of "seeming revenue" as it cascades through the value chain to Microsoft, CoreWeave, and NVIDIA, supporting an unsustainable $100 of equity market value.
Companies like CoreWeave collateralize massive loans with NVIDIA GPUs to fund their build-out. This creates a critical timeline problem: the industry must generate highly profitable AI workloads before the GPUs, which have a limited lifespan and depreciate quickly, wear out. The business model fails if valuable applications don't scale fast enough.
When capital flows in a circle—a chipmaker invests in an AI firm which then buys the investor's chips—it artificially inflates revenues and valuations. This self-dealing behavior is a key warning sign that the AI funding frenzy is a speculative bubble, not purely market-driven.