Unlike in private equity, an early-stage venture investment is a bet on the founder. If an early advisor, IP holder, or previous investor holds significant control, it creates friction and hinders the CEO's ability to execute. QED's experience shows that these situations are untenable and should be avoided.

With high partner turnover at large venture firms, a key diligence question for founders is whether the specific partner joining their board is likely to remain at that firm. A partner's departure can be highly disruptive, making their stability more important than firm brand.

The fundamental risk profile shifts dramatically between venture stages. Early-stage investors bet against business failure, an idiosyncratic risk unique to each company. Late-stage investors are primarily betting on public market multiples and macro sentiment holding up—a systematic risk affecting all late-stage assets simultaneously.

Small funds and solo GPs can gain an edge by not reserving capital for follow-on rounds. This strategy enforces discipline, avoids cognitive biases like sunk cost, and recognizes that the skill set for pre-seed diligence is fundamentally different from that required for later-stage investments.

A common mistake in venture capital is investing too early based on founder pedigree or gut feel, which is akin to 'shooting in the dark'. A more disciplined private equity approach waits for companies to establish repeatable, business-driven key performance metrics before committing capital, reducing portfolio variance.

The explosion in the number of solo GPs and small VC funds is not primarily fueled by institutions, but by a growing pool of individual and high-net-worth capital. This new LP base will demand fund structures with better liquidity and less administrative burden.

Unlike venture-backed startups that chase lightning in a bottle (often ending in zero), private equity offers a different path. Operators can buy established, cash-flowing businesses and apply their growth skills in a less risky environment with shorter time horizons and a higher probability of a positive financial outcome.

Unlike institutionalized asset managers that can be acquired, traditional venture firms are not sellable because their core asset is the non-transferable talent of a few key partners. If you cash out the partners, you're left with nothing.

Large, contrarian investments feel like career risk to partners in a traditional VC firm, leading to bureaucracy and diluted conviction. Founder-led firms with small, centralized decision-making teams can operate with more decisiveness, enabling them to make the bold, potentially firm-defining bets that consensus-driven partnerships would avoid.