Antti Ilmanen contrasts two forecasting methods. Objective forecasts (e.g., using market yields) predict higher returns from low valuations. Subjective forecasts (from investor surveys) extrapolate recent performance, becoming most bullish precisely when objective measures signal the most caution, creating a dangerous conflict for investors.

Jeff Aronson warns that prolonged success breeds dangerous overconfidence. When an investor is on a hot streak and feels they can do no wrong, their perception of risk becomes warped. This psychological shift, where they think "I must be good," is precisely when underlying risk is escalating, not diminishing.

During periods of intense market euphoria, investors with experience of past downturns are at a disadvantage. Their knowledge of how bubbles burst makes them cautious, causing them to underperform those who have only seen markets rebound, reinforcing a dangerous cycle of overconfidence.

Historically, US earnings outgrew the world by 1%. Post-GFC, this widened to 3%. Investors have extrapolated this recent, higher rate as the new normal, pushing the US CAPE ratio to nearly double that of non-US markets. This represents a historically extreme valuation based on a potentially temporary growth advantage.

With the S&P 500's Price-to-Earnings ratio near 28 (almost double the historic average) and the Shiller P/E near 40, the stock market is priced for perfection. These high valuation levels have historically only been seen right before major market corrections, suggesting a very thin safety net for investors.

Despite strong year-to-date performance in what feels like a resilient market, seasoned EM sovereign credit investors are publicly emphasizing caution. They recognize that stretched valuations, described as a 'glass overflowing', and potential US recession risks create significant downside vulnerability.

Despite a packed calendar of central bank decisions and key data releases, broad FX volatility is hovering near five-year lows. This suggests investors are underpricing potential market moves, and current options pricing for events like U.S. payrolls may be insufficient to cover a significant data surprise.

The primary driver of market fluctuations is the dramatic shift in attitudes toward risk. In good times, investors become risk-tolerant and chase gains ('Risk is my friend'). In bad times, risk aversion dominates ('Get me out at any price'). This emotional pendulum causes security prices to fluctuate far more than their underlying intrinsic values.

Conventional definitions of risk, like volatility, are flawed. True risk is an event you did not anticipate that forces you to abandon your strategy at a bad time. Foreseeable events, like a 50% market crash, are not risks but rather expected parts of the market cycle that a robust strategy should be built to withstand.