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Sam Lessin cautions that when an existing shareholder approaches you selling secondary shares in a private company, adverse selection is almost guaranteed. Because founders and early investors possess insider context, Lessin argues secondary buyers must conduct rigorous independent diligence rather than trusting the seller's narrative.

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In a non-control deal, an investor cannot fire management. Therefore, the primary diligence focus must shift from the business itself to the founder's character and the potential for a strong partnership, as this relationship is the ultimate determinant of success.

Deciding whether to sell a portion of a private company holding is not just about liquidity. It should be treated as a new investment decision, asking: "Are we more confident that growth will continue or accelerate from here, or are there significant headwinds?"

A failed deal where a co-owner backed out at the last minute taught the team that misaligned or unmotivated sellers should be treated as a major risk ("orange flag") early in the diligence process, before significant resources are spent.

A perverse incentive exists in unapproved secondary sales. A seller whose stock has since skyrocketed could theoretically argue the original sale was void due to company policy, allowing them to return the initial investment and reclaim their now far more valuable shares, creating immense risk for buyers.

VCs are generally comfortable with founders taking a small amount of secondary capital ($5M-$10M) to secure personal finances, as it can free them up to take bigger risks. However, selling beyond the $10M threshold is viewed as unacceptable and signals a lack of long-term commitment to the business.

When founders cash out millions early, it can create a disconnect. They become rich while their team and investors are not, which can reduce their hunger and create a 'moral hazard.' The motivation may shift from building a generation-defining company to preserving their newfound wealth.

The best practice for secondary market investors is to avoid cold-calling employees, which can create disruption. Instead, they should work directly with founders, who can act as a "sherpa" by guiding them to employees or early investors who are best suited for a liquidity event. This aligns incentives and helps constructively clean up the cap table.

An acquisition target with a valuation that seems 'too good to be true' is a major red flag. The low price often conceals deep-seated issues, such as warring co-founders or founders secretly planning to compete post-acquisition. Diligence on people and their motivations is more critical than just analyzing the financials in these cases.

The shift to longer private market cycles and secondary tender offers excludes retail investors until a high-priced IPO. Those who do access secondary markets often fly blind, making investment decisions based on hype ("vibes") without the financial transparency required in public markets.

Even well-intentioned sellers are motivated to close a deal and may present information in the most favorable light. This is often a human behavioral bias, not malicious lying. Acquirers must actively challenge and validate seller statements by testing assumptions and seeking external information.