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Major tech shifts like canals, railways, and fiber optics consistently wiped out their initial funders who financed essential but unprofitable infrastructure. A second wave of companies then acquired these assets for pennies on the dollar and built enormously valuable businesses on top.
History shows pioneers who fund massive infrastructure shifts, like railroads or the early internet, frequently lose their investment. The real profits are captured later by companies that build services on top of the now-established, de-risked platform.
The frenzy in AI investment mirrors past technological revolutions like railways. Following Schumpeter's theory, overinvestment occurs as many firms race for dominance. This leads to a bust where most fail, but the infrastructure they built remains, benefiting society in the long run.
Transformative technologies require massive initial capital for infrastructure (CapEx). The timing mismatch between spending and revenue often bankrupts early investors, as seen with railroads and the dot-com boom. The most profitable strategy is often to invest after the initial bubble bursts and the infrastructure is already built.
Massive upfront capital expenditure (CapEx) for AI infrastructure creates a timing gap before revenue materializes. This mirrors historical bubbles like the dot-com and railroad eras, where the technology succeeded but early investors were wiped out waiting for returns.
While many early investors in tech booms (e.g., telecom, AI) lose money, these 'bubbles' are not a societal waste. They fund the rapid construction of foundational infrastructure, like fiber optic networks or data centers, creating immense long-term value and options for future innovation that society ultimately benefits from.
The massive, redundant CapEx in AI infrastructure is analogous to the late-90s fiber-optic boom. While that fiber enabled future giants like Netflix, the initial investors went bankrupt. This suggests the ultimate beneficiaries of AI may be society and end-users, not the companies spending trillions on the build-out.
History shows a pattern where initial investors in revolutionary technologies like railroads and the internet get wiped out by massive infrastructure costs. The second wave of investors then profits by acquiring these assets cheaply. AI is poised to follow this same destructive pattern for early retail buyers.
While disastrous for many investors, historical bubbles like the dot-com boom and railway mania left behind massively overbuilt infrastructure (fiber optics, rail networks). This infrastructure became cheap and abundant post-crash, enabling subsequent waves of innovation that benefited society for decades.
Bubbles have a paradoxical benefit. While they cause immense financial pain for investors caught in the crash, the frenzied capital allocation during the boom often funds transformative infrastructure. The railroad and dot-com bubbles, for example, left behind the national rail network and the fiber-optic backbone of the modern internet.
Howard Marks distinguishes between two bubble types. "Mean reversion" bubbles (e.g., subprime mortgages) create no lasting value. In contrast, "inflection bubbles" (e.g., railroads, internet, AI) fund the necessary, often money-losing, infrastructure that accelerates technological progress for society, even as they destroy investor wealth.