Despite being led by brilliant product leaders, Drift's attempt to create the "conversational marketing" category ultimately failed to gain lasting traction. This serves as a cautionary tale: if even the smartest and most talented teams cannot successfully will a market into existence, the strategy itself is likely flawed.
Despite Drift's massive success, co-founder Elias Torres reflects that the product was ultimately "shallow." It excelled at the first customer connection (lead capture) but failed to carry that context through the entire customer journey. This created a fragmented experience and limited its depth, a key learning for his new company, Agency.
When creating a new category like Drift's "conversational marketing," no search volume exists for the new term. Marketers must capture demand from high-volume, existing terms (e.g., "live chat") and use that traffic to educate the audience on the new category's unique value.
Successful startups tap into organic customer needs that already exist—a 'pull' from the market. In contrast, 'conjuring demand' involves a founder trying to convince a market of a new worldview without prior evidence. This is a much harder and less reliable path to building a business.
When evaluating a startup, don't accept analogous trends as proof of demand. For example, Drift's pitch deck used consumer messaging growth to justify B2B marketing software. A better approach is to find direct evidence of business users already struggling with the specific project the product addresses.
Unlike info products, you can't just "sprinkle marketing" on a SaaS product post-build. SaaS requires solving a real pain point to prevent churn. Great marketing for a product nobody wants simply accelerates its demise by exposing its lack of product-market fit more quickly.
Many marketers mistakenly start with the goal of creating a new category. However, a new category only emerges as a downstream consequence of a strong, existing demand that is poorly served by all current products. The demand must exist before a new category can be successfully established.
The founder of StatusGator calls inventing the 'status page aggregator' category a mistake. While it eventually provided a first-mover advantage, it meant years of slow growth because no one was searching for the solution, highlighting the difficulty of educating a market.