While Chinese firms are anxious about their Venezuelan assets, their history in Iraq provides a roadmap. After the 2003 US-led invasion, Chinese companies were initially worried but eventually became the largest investors in Iraq's oil industry. This suggests a long-term strategy of patience and high risk tolerance to outlast political instability.
Related Insights
China's independent refiners, known as "Shandong teapots," benefit significantly from sanctioned oil. They purchase discounted crude from countries like Venezuela, boosting their margins and supporting local economies. This trade is often conducted in renminbi, furthering China's goal of de-dollarization in energy markets.
Despite major political upheaval in Venezuela, the oil market's reaction is minimal. This is because the short-term supply impact is ambiguous, with an equal probability of production increasing through U.S. re-engagement or decreasing due to intensified blockades, creating a balanced risk profile.
Contrary to assumptions, oil majors are cautious about re-entering Venezuela. They worry about a lack of legal certainty and the risk that any deals could be undone and heavily scrutinized by a future U.S. administration, making the investment too risky.
While a $10 billion loss on Venezuelan loans is substantial, it's a small fraction of the over $2 trillion China has lent via its Belt and Road Initiative. For Beijing, the erosion of a key strategic foothold in Latin America is a far greater concern than the financial write-down.
The US troop buildup near Venezuela isn't just about oil; it's a strategic move to counter China's growing economic influence in South America. China is establishing a gold-backed currency network, and the US is using military leverage on Venezuelan allies to disrupt this challenge to its hemispheric dominance.
The hosts argue that even with vast oil reserves and government encouragement, the political instability, power vacuum, and lack of rule of law in Venezuela make it a poor investment for oil companies. The cost and uncertainty of securing profits are too high.
China loaned Venezuela over $60 billion but halted funding due to extreme corruption. Instead of making new strategic investments, China now focuses on asset recovery, accepting oil shipments simply to pay down the massive outstanding debt. This highlights the limits of 'debt trap diplomacy' in utterly dysfunctional states.
Contrary to popular belief, China's influence in Venezuela is primarily economic, not strategic. They are a key consumer of oil but do not control the industry or the government. Russia, in fact, has a more embedded military and strategic presence in the country.
By leaving the existing Chavista power structure largely intact after removing Maduro, the U.S. is applying a key lesson from Iraq: avoiding a power vacuum and the chaos of de-Ba'athification is paramount for stability.
China's strategy in Latin America is not just about oil and loans. It includes extensive sales of military equipment, intelligence sharing, pushing its 5G and Beidou satellite systems, and even foreign aid. This deep, multi-faceted integration makes its presence resilient, even with setbacks like Venezuela.